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In light of increasing incidents of child abuse' and media2
coverage of legal proceedings, consider the following scenario:
During a high profile trial involving the sexual abuse of several
young children, the prosecutor requests closure of the courtroom
arguing that the child victim-witnesses are intimidated and may
refuse to testify if the courtroom is full of spectators. Moreover,
the child victim-witnesses may be emotionally traumatized if
the courtroom remains open to the public. However, the defend-
ant objects, based on a Sixth Amendment right to have the pub-
lic present to observe the children's accusations. The media ob-
jects, arguing on behalf of itself and the public, that it has a
First Amendment right to attend, observe and report on infor-
mation gathered at the trial. The question is: Whose interests
should prevail?
Alternatively, imagine a child custody proceeding involving
parents who are public figures. An attorney representing the
child's interests requests closing the courtroom, contending that
the child should be protected from the pressures of an open trial
and the resulting media coverage. Once again, the media ob-
jects, asserting its First Amendment rights. Here too, the ques-
tion is: Whose interests should prevail?
t Associate, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler, LLP; J.D. 1995, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law;, AB. 1992, Columbia College, Columbia University The author would
like to thank the following people for their comments on this Article: Roland Acevedo,
Rory Bellantoni, Deborah Denno, Sam Levine, Annemarie Mazzone and Ken Tabachnick.
The opinions in this Article are of the author only and do not reflect those of Patterson
Belknap or its clients.
1. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
2. "Media" will be used to refer to both the print media, i.e., newspapers and
magazines, and television media, i.e., media involving cameras that televise or broadcast
information. "Television media" and "print media" will be used to refer to either
individually.
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In recent years the United States Supreme Court has con-
sidered a number of cases in which it balanced the rights and
interests of the media against those of other trial participants,
establishing a right on behalf of the media to attend and report
on legal proceedings.3 But, the Court has not granted the televi-
sion media the right to televise legal proceedings. However,
most states have statutes permitting cameras in the courtroom
and the federal courts continue to evaluate the prudence and
advantages of televised legal proceedings.
4
The television media's access to legal proceedings has gener-
ated concerns regarding whether limits should be placed on tele-
vised trials.5 Recently, trials, such as the O.J. Simpson, the Me-
3. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 US. 555 (1980); Landmark Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976). See also G. Michael Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceed-
ings: To Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARv. C.R-C.L. L REV. 415, 415 (1982);
David N. Kuriyama, Note, The -Right- of Information Triangle: A First Amendment Ba-
sis for Televising Judicial Proceedings, 4 U. HAw. L REv. 85, 109-10 (1982); infra Part
l.A The only remaining controversial area, with respect to the media's right to publish
information accessed while at a legal proceeding, is whether the media may publish or
broadcast the names of victims of sexual assault or other sexual abuse. See infra note
228.
4. Federal courts continue to debate the presence of cameras during civil proceed-
ings. In criminal cases, Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure bars televi-
sion cameras from the courtroom-The taking of photographs in the court room during
the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from
the courtroom shall not be permitted by the court." FED. IL CRIm. P. 53. In December
1994, the federal judiciary ended a three-year broadcasting experiment. See Henry J.
Reske, A Repeat Performance, A.BA J., May 1996, at 38; see generally Henry J. Reske,
Rally for Court Cameras Falls Short, A.BA J., Mar. 1995, at 30; J. Stratton Shartel,
Cameras in the Courts: Early Returns Show Few Side Effects, 7 INSIDE LITIG. 1 (1993)
(explaining experiments in the Second and Ninth Circuits with cameras in the court-
room); Deborah Squiers, Southern District Judges Vote to Try Cameras, N.Y. L., Sept.
28, 1990, at 1. In March 1996, the United States Judicial Conference voted 14-12 to al-
low the federal appeals courts to permit television, radio and still photography to cover
appellate proceedings, however, they urged each circuit to bar the broadcasting of dis-
trict court proceedings. Reske, A Repeat Performance, supra.
The Second Circuit has refused to eliminate local rules permitting television cover-
age of civil legal proceedings. Deborah Pines, Circuit Council Leaves Camera Rule Intact,
N.Y. IJ., June 14, 1996, at 1. For example, Local Rule 1.8 in the Southern District of
New York permits cameras in the courtroom at the court's discretion. Id. Pursuant to
this rule, at least two judges have allowed cameras in their courtrooms during civil pro-
ceedings. See Marisol v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Katzman v. Victoria's
Secret Catalogue, 923 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In the Eastern District of New York,
which is governed by the same Local Rule, at least one judge has permitted cameras in
the courtroom. See Daniel Wise, Judge Defies Federal Policy on Cameras, N.Y. W., Oct.
22, 1996, at 1.
5. See, ag., Robert G. Morvillo, Television and the Public Trial, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 1,
1997, at 3; Gag Order Over Simpson Reflects Shift in Attitude, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26,
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nendez brothers, and the Nanny Woodward trials brought this
issue once again to the attention of both legal scholars and the
public. Swift technological advancements, combined with height-
ened public interest in legal proceedings, 6 subjects increasing
numbers of people to televised legal proceedings. These techno-
logical advancements and heightened public interest require
lawmakers to continuously reevaluate7 how the media affects
the legal process, particularly those proceedings that involve
children."
Before turning to the essence of this Article, it is necessary
to set the stage, which includes a discussion of the history of
public trials and the media's access to legal proceedings. Accord-
ingly, Part I briefly outlines the history of public trials, their
role in the judicial system, circumstances under which court-
rooms have been closed and the present landscape of statutes
permitting closure. Part I also discusses a criminal defendant's
rights implicated by a closed legal proceeding. Because a defend-
ant's rights and concerns are constitutionally protected, they
must be balanced not only with the media's and the public's
First Amendment rights but also with a child victim-witness's
interests and a state's rights on behalf of the child victim-
witness.
1996, at A7; James C. Goodale, Cameras, the Courts and the Missing 'Simpson" Back-
lash, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 2, 1996, at 3; Steven Keeva, Circus-Like Trial Colors Expectation,
A.BA. J., Nov. 1995, at 48c; Henry J. Reske, Courtroom Cameras Fail New Scrutiny,
ABA J., Nov. 1995, at 48d.
6. For example, the Court Television Network ("Court TV"), launched on July 1,
1991, can now be seen in 14.1 million homes. The network broadcasts trials from all
over the country and provides commentary. Televised trials include the widely publicized
William Kennedy Smith rape trial, the Menendez brothers murder trial, both Bobbitt
trials, the Louise Woodward Nanny Murder trial, the Bernie Goetz civil trial, the Kevor-
Man trials, and the O.J. Simpson trial. In October 1993, Court TV ranked fourth on the
Nielsen ratings during the day for viewers who receive the channel. Massimo Calabresi,
Swaying the Home Jury, TIME, Jan. 10, 1994, at 56; See generally Shartel, supra note 4;
see also Court TV Website, Feb. 1, 1998, <http'//www.courtly.com/aboutlctvfaq.html>.
7. See Today's News: Update, N.Y. ILJ., Aug. 27, 1996, at 1. At least one state, New
York, reevaluated the use of cameras in the courtroom. Id. Governor Pataki assembled a
committee to examine the impact of cameras in the courtroom. Id. Although the commit-
tee recommended allowing the state courts to continue to permit televised action, Daniel
Vise, Report Favors TV Cameras in Court, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 4, 1997, at 1, the new bill died
in the state senate. Gary Spencer, Effort on Cameras in Court Dies, N.Y. LJ., July 16,
1997, at 1. The statute having lapsed leaves cameras without access to New York State
courts. Id.
8. Heightened awareness may cause more people to seek out and watch legal pro-
ceedings. In a race to provide coverage, the media becomes focused on reporting legal
proceedings, regardless of whether children are involved.
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Part H examines the current legal landscape of the media's
rights, including the impact of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, a seminal case that balanced the media's rights with a
state's interest in protecting children.9 Part II also discusses the
effects and consequences of cameras in the courtroom, beginning
with a look at two instances in which the United States Su-
preme Court has addressed the issue-Estes v. Texas10 and
Chandler v. Florida.1
Finally, Part III explores the role of, and potential harm to,
the child victim-witness during legal proceedings as the trial
participant most likely to suffer psychological trauma from an
open legal proceeding. 2 Part III also discusses the disadvan-
tages of alternatives to closure, concluding that the interests of
the state and child are better served by closed courtrooms.
This Article suggests that, even though the current state of
the law makes it difficult to bar the media from a courtroom,
the media should be barred under certain circumstances, partic-
ularly during a child's testimony in criminal cases and during
child custody proceedings. Furthermore, this Article recom-
mends that a child's testimony should never be televised.
I. HIsToRIcAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN
TRIALS
A. Historical Development13
Before the Norman Conquests in England, trials were
mandatorily attended by the "freemen" who rendered verdicts. 14
As the jury system developed, attendance was no longer
mandatory, but trials remained open. 5 Open trials continued in
the United States, as is evidenced in the early documents of Vir-
9. 457 US. 596 (1982).
10. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
11. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
12. See infra notes 215-221 and accompanying text.
13. For a more extended history of public trials see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Vnginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73 (1980); In re Oliver, 333 US. 257, 266-72 (1948); see also
Max Radin, Note, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. LQ. 381 (1932); Ruth Ann Strick-
land & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A Historical Perspective, JUDICA.
TRUE, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 128-35, 160.
14. Richmond, 448 US. at 565 (citing Pollack, English Law Before the Norman Con-
quest, in 1 SELEcT EssAYs iN ANGLo-AMERiCAN HI RY 88, 89 (1907)); Jack B. Harrison,
Note, How Open is Open? The Development of the Public Access Doctrine Under State
Open Court Provisions, 60 U. CINN. L. REv. 1307, 1308 (1992).
15. Richmond, 448 US. at 565; Harrison, supra note 14, at 1308.
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ginia, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.16 The doctrine of open tri-
als was then incorporated into the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution-the Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent
part, "The accused shall enjoy the right to a... public trial."'7
One historical motivation offered for the presumption of
openness in criminal trials is the unjust treatment of the ac-
cused in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in many Eu-
ropean countries. For example, the Star Chamber in England
obtained confessions from defendants through torture during se-
cret proceedings, in which they were not permitted to confront
the witnesses testifying against them.18 In France there were
lettres de cachet that were issued by the king and "order[ed] the
indefinite imprisonment of any particular person." 9 The abuses
of the Spanish Inquisition also gave "an odor of sanctity" to pub-
lic trials.20 These practices and events may have demonstrated
that open trials were necessary in order to guarantee fair, just
trials.2
1
Although it is unclear precisely how the presumption of
openness developed, the criminal trial has been open to the
press and general public since the birth of our country's legal
system,22 and the United States Supreme Court has upheld this
principle.'
16. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 567-68; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386
n.15 (1979).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 387 n.18; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267-69 & n.22
(1948); William John Zak, Jr., Note, Sixth Amendment Issues Posed by the Court-Martial
of Clayton Lonetree, 30 A. CRmL L REv. 187, 192 (1992).
19. Radin, supra note 13, at 388; see also Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268-69 & n.23; Zak,
supra note 18.
20. Radin, supra note 13, at 389; see also Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268; Zak, supra note
18.
21. Alternatively, one author suggests, that the Star Chamber may have been abol-
ished to stop the tortuous treatment rather than to prevent secret trials. Radin, supra
note 13, at 386-87.
22. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982). See Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73 (1980); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 385, 386
n.15 ('There is no question that the Sixth Amendment permits and even presumes open
trials as a norm.'); Oliver, 333 US. at 266-72; see also Note, The Right to a Public Trial
in Criminal Cases, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1138, 1138-39 (1966) [hereinafter NYU Note]; Ra-
din, supra, note 13.
23. Globe, 457 U.S. at 605; Richmond, 448 US. at 569, 573 n.9. See also Radin,
supra note 13, at 389. Radin states that the presumption of an open trial has 'found for-
mulation as a constitutional right in almost every state, and in the United States Con-
stitution! Id.
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1. Exceptions to the Presumption of Openness. Despite this
long standing presumption of openness, trials have been closed
to the public under certain circumstances.2' For example, during
trials involving the testimony of undercover police officers,2 in-formants26 or witnesses who fear for their safety2 7 A judge also
may close a courtroom if necessary to ensure a fair trial for the
defendant,28 to prevent overcrowding 29 or to quell courtroom dis-
turbances.30 Moreover, many trials involving sex crimes and
children were closed to the public.3' In fact, many states con-
24. See John C. Hearn, Note, Globe Newspaper: Sounding the Death Knell for Clo-
sure in Courtroom Proceedings?, 3 PACE L. REV. 395, 399 (1983) (discussing exceptions
involving undercover agents and witnesses needing protection); NYU Note, supra note
22, at 1144-46.
25. See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyzing state court de-
cisions to close courtrooms during testimony of undercover officers); Peterson v. Williams,
85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 E2d 1272 (2d Cir.
1975); People v. Richard Sheppard, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 12, 1996, at 26 (decision of Supreme
Court Judge Thompldns). Cf. Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994).
26. See, eg., United States v. Hernandez, 608 E2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979).
27. See, eg., United States v. Doe, 63 F3d 121 (2d Cir. 1995); Woods v. Kuhlmann,
977 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1992); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F2d 743 (10th Cir. 1989); United
States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Orlando
v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965); People v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395 (1969); NYU Note,
supra note 22, at 1145 & n.55; Matthew Goldstein, Judge's Exclusion of Group from
Courtroom Allowed, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 11, 1997, at 1 (discussing People v. Hok Ming Chan
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1997)). But see Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772 (2d Cir. 1996).
28. NYU Note, supra note 22, at 1144-45.
29. Id.; see also A BACKGROUND REPORT PREPARED FOR AND PRESENTED TO THE SuB-
COMBL ON CONSrITUTIONAL RiGHTS OF =a COMM. ON TM JUDICIARiY UNITED STATES SENATE,
94TH CONG., 2d SEES., FAIR TRIAL AND FREE EXPRESSION 24 (Comm. Print 1976); Hearn,
supra note 24, at 399; Radin, supra note 13, at 390.
30. See Cosentino v. Kelly, 102 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 1996); Ostelaza v. Warden, 603 A.2d
768 (Conn. App. 1992); Retrial's Closure Held No Basis for Habeas, N.Y. LJ., May 14,
1996, at 1 (discussing Magana v. Kelly, 95 Civ. 3388 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1996)).
31. See generally Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 569, 614 (1982)
(Burger, J., dissenting); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691
(7th Cir. 1977); Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966) (the court observed that
closing the courtroom during the testimony of a rape victim is a 'frequent and accepted
practice"); Melanson v. O'Brien, 191 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1951); Callahan v. United States,
240 F. 683 (9th Cir. 1917); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1913) (the
court emphasized that a rape victim should not be forced to testify in front of a "crowd
of idle, gaping loafers, whose morbid curiosity would lead them to attend such a trial");
United States v. Greise, 158 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Ala. 1958) (the court stated that a
trial judge may exclude members of the public in a criminal trial, 'in order to protect a
witness from embarrassment by reason of having to testify to delicate or revolting facts,
as a child... 7); affid, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958); State v. Smith, 599 P.2d 199 (Ariz.
1979); Hogan v. State, 86 S.W.2d 931 (Ark. 1935) (the court permitted closure where it
was apparent that the victim was "terribly frightened and embarrassed to have to go
upon the witness stand in the presence of a courtroom crowded with people... ."); State
v. Purvis, 251 A.2d 178, 182 (Conn. 1968) (the court concluded that the "temporary and
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tinue to permit closure during legal proceedings involving chil-
dren or sex crimes.3 2 This fact was largely ignored by the United
limited exclusion of the general public," during the minor's testimony was permissible);
Moore v. State, 108 S.E. 47 (Ga. 1921) (the court observed that when it appears to the
court that the victim, on account of her youth and highly nervous condition, is unable
to give her testimony before a crowd of spectators ... the trial judge may clear the
courtroom"); Beauchamp v. Cahill, 180 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1944); People v. Latimore, 342
N.E.2d 209 (1l. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 434 N.E.2d 633 (Mass. 1982); Com-
monwealth v. Blondin, 87 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. 1949); State v. Guajardo, 605 A.2d 217
(N.H. 1992); State v. Workman, 14 Ohio App. 3d 385, 471 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio App. 1984);
State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 413 A.2d 58 (R.L 1980); State v. Datm, 252 N.W. 7 (S.D.
1933); Mosby v. State, 703 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App. 1985); Grimmett v. State, 2 S.W. 631
(Tex. App. 1886); State v. Rusin, 568 A.2d 403 (Vt. 1989) (list of cases cited in Frumkin,
infra note 217, at 658-59 & n.163); see also Benjamin S. Duval, Jr., The Occasions of Se-
crecy, 47 U. Prrr. L REv. 579, 646 (1986) ("a second exception to the norm of openness in
judicial proceedings involves sex offenses"); NYU Note, supra note 22, at 1145 & n.53;
Radin, supra note 13, at 385, 389-90 & n.13.
32. Most of the statutes provide that a court, in its discretion, may close a court-
room when a child or a victim of a sex crime is testifying. Sometimes the statutes re-
quire a showing that closure will reduce psychological damage. See, ag., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 868.7 (West 1996) (mentioning nervousness and embarrassment); Aiz REv. STAT.
R. CRnm PRoc. 9.3, (discussing trauma of the victim). The following is a list of the state
statutes:
ALA. CODE § 12-21-202 (1995) (applies to sex crimes and defendant's consent re-
quired); ALASKA, STAT. § 25.20.120 (Michie 1995) (pertains to child custody hear-
ings); ARIz. REv. STAT. R. CRm PRoc. 9.3 (to prevent embarrassment or emo-
tional disturbance); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-204 (Michie 1995) (defendant can
request closure); CAL PENAL CODE § 868.7 (West 1996) (minors, victims of sex
crimes or to prevent loss of life); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-11 (West 1996)
(pertains to family matters or welfare of children); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.16
(West 1996) (closure for sexual crimes and children under 16, except as to the
media); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-8-53 to 17-8-54 (1996) (§ 53 pertains to vulgar
facts; § 54 pertains to children under 16 and excepts the media); 725 ILL. CoMp.
STAT. ANN. § 5/115-11 (West 1996) (closure for children under 18, except as to
the media); IowA CODE ANN. § 813.2, Rule 2(4Xd) (West 1996) (closure upon
defendant's request); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.92 (West 1996) (closure for
juveniles); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1552 (1995) (exclusion upon consent in adjudi-
catory proceedings involving children); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (West
1996) (sex crimes and children under 15); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 457
(West 1995) (refers to pre-trial proceedings); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278,
§ 16A (West 1996) (sex crimes and children under 18); MICH. Comp. Lws ANN.
§ 600.2163a(1OXa), (12Xa) (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.045 (West 1996)
(sex crimes, children under 18); Miss. CONST. art. I, § 26 (sex crimes); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 171.204 (1995) (for good cause); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-1 (West 1996)
(in child custody proceedings with children under 16); NJ. 1R oF CT. Rule 7:4-4
(West 1995) (sex crimes and domestic relations with defendant's consent); N.Y.
Jun. Lw § 4 (McKinney 1996) (in divorce and other case and sex crimes); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (1994) (sex crimes); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1993)
(scandalous or obscene material); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-953 (Law Co-op. 1993)
(child custody proceedings); S.D. CODnPID LAws § 23A-24-6 (Michie 1996) (sex
crimes or minor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1996) (divorce and sex crimes); VT.
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States Supreme Court in two cases addressing this issue, Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia3 and Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, which will be discussed in more detail shortly.3
As Justice Burger noted in his dissent in Globe, "It would mis-
represent the historical record to state that there is an 'unbro-
ken, uncontradicted history' of open proceedings in cases involv-
ing the sexual abuse of minors." 5
B. Purposes Behind an Open Trial
Ideally, an open trial serves the interests of the defendant
as well as society as a whole. For the defendant an open legal
proceeding 6 allows the public to assess whether the defendant
is being treated fairly or being unjustly condemned.37
To that end, open trials help to ensure that witnesses tes-
tify truthfully,-8 because if an audience member realizes a wit-
ness is committing perjury, the audience member can reveal
that information to the court.39 Perjury is therefore discouraged
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901 (1995) (scandalous and obscene material); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.8 (Michie 1993) (pertains to complaining witness during prelimi-
nary hearings); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Michie 1993) (during trials); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.110 (West 1996) (child custody proceedings); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 970.03 (4)(a) (West 1996) (sex crimes); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-224
(Michie 1996) (juveniles); 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1997).
See also Globe, 457 U.S. at 608 n.22; Forman, infra note 249, at 443 n.45. Some of
the circumstances for closing trials other than when a sex crime is charged or the wit-
ness is a child include-when the evidence is Wulgarl or it would "debauch the morals of
the jury," eg., ALTA CODE § 12-21-202 (1996), or in order to protect a witness' safety, eg.,
CAL PENAL CODE § 868.7 (West 1996), or to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial,
e.g., AEm Rav. STAT. R CraM PRoc. 9.3.
33. 448 US. 555 (1980). Richmond gave the media a First Amendment right to at-
tend criminal trials. See infra Part .I.1
34. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Globe involved a challenge by the media of a state's request
for closure. See infra Part HIA1.
35. Globe, 457 US. at 614 (Burger, J., dissenting). Indeed, in at least one prior opin-
ion the Court noted proceedings in which the courtroom had been closed while children
and/or victims of sex crimes were testifying. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 US.
368, 388 n.19 (1979).
36. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part,
"The accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...." US. CoNST. amend.
VI.
37. Waller v. Georgia, 467 US. 39, 46 (1984); Richmond, 448 US. at 569, 593 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Gannett, 443 US. at 380; Estes v. Texas, 381 US. 532, 538-39
(1965); In re Oliver, 333 US. 257, 270-71 (1948); 1 T. COOLEY, A TRE TIE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LMTATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927); 6 J. WIGMoRE, EviDENCE § 1834, at 438 (1940).
38. Waller, 467 US. at 46; Richmond, 448 US. at 569.
39. Gannett, 443 US. at 383; WIGMORE, supra note 37, at 435-36; NYU Note, supra
note 22, at 1139.
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because a witness confronted with such a risk may be less likely
to lie.4° Furthermore, an audience member may realize that she
has additional information helpful to the case and can inform
the parties.
41
In addition, an open trial enhances the likelihood that attor-
neys and judges will execute their jobs properly.4 By scrutiniz-
ing the proceedings, the public ensures that the defense attor-
ney provides the best possible defense, the prosecutor properly
advocates the people's case and the judge rules fairly on any ob-
jections, gives proper jury instructions and does not abuse judi-
cial power. The public, in essence, serves as a check on the
system.43
Open trials also educate the public about the workings of
the criminal justice system,44 promote the public's confidence in
the system45 and ensure the public that justice has prevailed.46
These three purposes are interdependent: A public viewing a
trial learns about judicial procedures. 47 If the trial proceeds
fairly, the public gains confidence in the system because it is en-
sured that the system will protect and treat it and its families
fairly. Moreover, when the public is outraged by a crime, a pub-
lic trial can be an "outlet for community concern, hostility, and
40. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 597; Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Women's Tribulation:
Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM L REv. 1, 89 (1977).
41. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383; Oliver, 333 US. at 270 n.24; WIGMORE, supra note 37,
at 332-33; Berger, supra note 40, at 89; NYU Note, supra note 22, at 1139.
42. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46; Gannett, 443 US. at 383; Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270; United
States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1989), amended and superseded by 962 E2d
1348 (1989); United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979); WIGMoRE, supra
note 37, at 335; Berger, supra note 40, at 89; NYU Note, supra note 22, at 1139; Radin,
supra note 13, at 394.
43. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 US. 596, 606 (1982); Richmond,
448 US. at 569, 596 (Brennan, J., concurring); Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270-71; Nancy T.
Gardner, Note, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines for State Criminal Trials, 84
Mic. L REv. 475, 492-93 (1985); Radin, supra note 13, at 394.
44. Globe, 457 US. at 606; Richmond, 448 US. at 571-72; WIGMORE, supra note 36,
at 335; Berger, supra note 39, at 89; Gardner, supra note 42, at 492; NYU Note, supra
note 21, at 1139. Cf. Radin, supra note 12, at 393-94.
45. Globe, 457 US. at 606; Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270; WIGMoRE, supra note 36, at 335;
Berger, supra note 39, at 89.
46. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond, 448 US. at 571-72 & 594 (Brennan, J., con-
curring); see also Gardner, supra note 42, at 493; Radin, supra note 12, at 394.
47. Many authors question the amount the public does, and desires to, learn from
watching a trial. For example, Radin, supra note 12, at 393, finds that it is ridiculous to
think that people go to trials for education. The public only goes to trial, "when testi-
mony is likely to contain obscene details or scandalous matters ... " or to get an "emo-
tional... [or] morbid stimulation... ." Id. Even if this characterization is accurate, at-
tendance could nevertheless educate the public.
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emotion."48 Therefore, the public will be less likely to turn to
vigilantism.49 In sum, "[p]ublic scrutiny of a criminal trial en-
hances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfind-
ing process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society
as a whole." 0
C. Further Concerns Regarding the Defendant's Rights5
When discussing courtroom closure and the interests of a
child victim-witness, two of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights52 are implicated-the right to confrontation and the right
to an open trial. This Article deals only with the right to an
open trial because courtroom closure does not implicate a
defendant's right to confrontation.
5 3
The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an open and
public trial is not absolute.14 Accordingly, a defendant cannot de-
mand open or closed legal proceedings.55 There are different con-
cerns, however, facing the criminal defendant which may lead
the defendant to request closed or open proceedings. First, a
defendant may object to a closed courtroom simply based on a
constitutional right to an open trial which provides the previ-
48. Richmond, 448 US. at 571; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
Ca., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) [hereinafter Press II]; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
of Ca., 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) [hereinafter Press 1]; Gardner, supra note 43, at 493.
49. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 571. Arguably, the opposite occurred after the Rodney
King verdict in California. The public, outraged by the crime committed, and expecting
convictions of the police officers charged, rioted when the officers were acquitted. Hence,
what the public viewed did not give it a sense of confidence and justice. In fact, it may
have inflamed the public further. However, most likely, the majority of the public viewed
only soundbites and not the entire trial Accordingly, it is unclear whether the outcome
would have been the same had the public viewed the entire trial.
50. Globe, 457 US. at 606.
5L Obviously, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are only implicated in a crimi-
nal proceeding, not in a child custody or other civil proceeding.
52. The Sixth Amendment reads in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... [and]
to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ! US. CONST. amend VI. This ap-
plies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
53. See infra note 250 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C.
54. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 US. 368, 382 (1979); infra Part HIA.1.
55. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (discussing
while a defendant can request closure, the defendant cannot compel it); Gannett, 443
U.S. at 382; BACKGROUND REPORT PREPARED FOR AND PRESENTED TO THE SUBCOMM. ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF T=E ComM. ON THE JuDIcIARY UNITED STATES SENATE, 94TH
CONG., 2d SEss., FAiR TAL AND FREE EXPRESSION 25 (Comm. Print 1976) (defendant has
no right to a private trial (citing Singer v. United States, 380 US. 24 (1965)), because
his asserted rights conflict with those of the media). See discussion infra notes 86-106
and accompanying text.
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ously discussed protections.5 6 Second, closing a courtroom could
imply to the jury that the child was traumatized, or a jury sim-
ply may be more likely to believe that child's testimony sensing
that the child was traumatized. The criminal defendant wants
to avoid these inferences.
On the other hand, a defendant may desire a closed pro-
ceeding. In this case, the child's and the defendant's motives are
aligned to protect an equally important Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury,57 in which case, the defendant's interests
and rights would be weighed solely against the First Amend-
ment rights of the media.
II. MEDIA'S ACCESS TO COURTROOMS
A. The Right to Attend Legal Proceedings
1. Supreme Court Cases. Beginning in the early 1970s, the
United States Supreme Court increasingly granted the media
the right to gather,58 and publish gathered information from le-
56. See supra Part I.B.
57. This is an extremely important right for a defendant, which has been exten-
sively litigated and commented upon and is not implicated by a child's interests in clos-
ing a courtroom. Briefly, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury en-
sures a "fair trial." See, eg., Abraham Abramovsky, Moderator, Impact of the Media on
Fair Trial Rights: Panel on Media Access, 3 FoRDHAm INTELt. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L..
291, 311 (1993) [hereinafter Symposium]. To ensure this right, a defendant might actu-
ally desire a closed courtroom in an attempt to prevent disclosure of information that
might prevent a fair trial. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 378 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966) ("[The] Court has long recognized that adverse publicity can endanger
the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial")); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 US. 717 (1961);
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 US. 539, 570 (1976); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); see generally Abra-
ham Abramovsky, Prejudicial Pre-trial Publicity, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 3. For exam-
ple, if jurors saw a news broadcast about the trial they were sitting on, they may be
prejudiced by what they saw on television. See Symposium, supra, at 311 (speaker com-
menting on a National Law Journal article in which it was reported fifty percent of the
jurors interviewed admitted to reading or watching media reports even though they had
been instructed not to, including learning about inadmissible evidence). During the Sym-
posium there was much debate regarding whether a defendant will ever be prejudiced by
televising pre-trial proceedings or trials. The representatives of the media argue, with
regard to pre-trial proceedings, that the attorneys can pick a jury that knows little or
nothing about the case and that in fact a very small percentage of prospective jurors
ever know what the case is about because "most people don't read all this good stuffi" Id.
at 303; see also id. at 293, 317, 310, 318-19. But see Abramovsky, supra ('jurors are
prejudiced by the irresponsible publication of extrajudicial information.. :).
58. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 US. 665 (1972); see also David N. Kuriyama, Note, The
'Right" of Information Triangle: A irst Amendment Basis For Televising Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 4 U. HAw. L. REV. 85, 109-10 (1982).
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gal proceedings without sanction.59 In response to these deci-
sions, many lower courts closed courtrooms to prevent the media
from gathering information that the court did not want pub-
lished.6° The Supreme Court did not prohibit this practice and
instead seemed to affirm it in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.61 Ana-
lyzing the Sixth Amendment, the Court found that the right to
an open trial belonged to a defendant, 2 and that the media had
no independent right to attend a trial. 3 However, this general
rule did not stand for long.
The Supreme Court's recognition of the media's right to at-
tend criminal trials is a relatively recent development. One year
after Gannett, the Court held in Richmond Newspapers, Inc, v.
Virginia,64 that the public, including the media, has a right to
59. In 1976, the Court recognized the media's right to publish any information it
gathered while in court. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); see
also Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 US. 308 (1977); Fenner & Koley, supra
note 3, at 415. Then in 1978, the Court held that once the media legally gathered infor-
mation, it could publish it without sanction. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); see also Fenner & Koley, supra note 3, at 415.
60. See Fenner & Koley, supra note 3, at 416.
61. 443 US. 368 (1979). In Gannett, three defendants were charged with second de-
gree murder, robbery and grand larceny. The victim disappeared, and the defendants
were initially unknown; therefore, publicity ensued. Id. at 371-75.
At a suppression hearing the defendants asked for closure because the adverse pub-
licity would make a fair trial improbable. The People did not oppose the motion and it
was granted. Id. The following day a reporter ('Petitioner') requested that the suppres-
sion hearing be open to the public. Id. The judge responded that the request was moot
because the hearing had concluded. Id. Petitioner moved to set aside the exclusionary or-
der. Id A second hearing was held at which it was concluded that the media had a right
to attend the hearing, but that right was outbalanced by the defendants' rights to a fair
trial. Id. The New York Appellate Division, Fourth Department, vacated the order. Id.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that criminal trials were presumptively open
but that in this case the defendants' rights overcame the presumption. Id. The exclusion
was upheld. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorarL Id. at 375-77.
62. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379-82; see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
63. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381-84; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inm. v. Virginia, 448
US. 555, 584-85 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. 448 US. 555 (there was no opinion by the Court; however, seven judges recog-
nized the right of the public to attend a criminal trial). In Richmond, the defendant, was
indicted for the murder of a hotel manager found stabbed on December 2, 1975. See id.
at 559-63 (discussing the defendant's trial and convictions of second degree murder in
July, 1976). The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the conviction in October, 1977, be-
cause of improperly admitted evidence. Id. The retrial ended in a mistrial because no al-
ternate juror was available to replace an excused juror. Id. The third trial also ended in
a mistrial because a juror read about the defendant's previous trials. I& The fourth trial
began in September, 1978. The defendant asked that the trial be closed, the People did
not object and the court closed the courtroom. Id. No objections were made at that time.
Later that day, appellants, the reporters, requested a hearing to vacate the closure or-
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attend a criminal trial,65 founded not on the Sixth Amendment,
which the Gannett Court addressed, but on the First
Amendment.6
We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment. Without the freedom to attend such trials,
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom
of speech and "of the press could be eviscerated."6
The Court explained that Richmond was a case of first impres-
sion because the Gannett Court addressed only whether there
was a right of access to pre-trial proceedings, not trials. 8 Fur-
thermore, the Richmond Court noted that the Gannett Court did
not address whether the media had a First Amendment right to
attend a criminal trial.6 9 Accordingly, the Richmond Court fur-
thered the media's rights by finding that it had a First Amend-
ment right to attend trials.
Two years later in Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior
Court,70 the Court addressed courtroom closure and children vic-
der. Id. The hearing was held and the appellants argued that the judge had to make
findings and consider alternatives to closure before making a decision. Id. The appel-
lants' motion was denied. At the conclusion of the People's case, the defendant moved for
a mistrial and to strike the People's evidence. Id. The court sustained the motion to
strike and found the defendant not guilty. Id. Appellants then intervened nun pro tune
and petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for writs of mandamus and prohibition and
also filed an appeal of the closure order. Id. On July 9, 1979, the court dismissed the
mandamus and prohibition petitions, and finding no reversible error, denied the petition
for appeal. Id. The Supreme Court then granted certiorarL Id.
65. See Richmond, 448 US. at 580.
66. The First Amendment reads in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... : US. CONST. amend. L
67. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681
(1977) (footnotes omitted)).
68. Richmond, 448 US. at 564.
69. Id.
70. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In Globe, a Massachusetts statute required trials, for spe-
cific sexual offenses and involving victims under eighteen, to be closed to the media and
public during the victim's testimony. Id. The defendant was tried for the rape of three
girls, two aged sixteen and one aged seventeen. Id. The judge, pursuant to the statute,
ordered the courtroom closed. Id. Petitioner, Globe, asked that the order be revoked and
a hearing held. Id. The judge refused and Globe objected. Id. Globe then sought iqjunc-
tive relief from a justice of the Supreme Judiciary Court. Id. Relief was denied. Id.
Meanwhile the defendant was acquitted. Id. Globe then appealed to the full court. Id.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding it was acceptable to close the courtroom during
part of the trial. Id. On the issue of whether the media had a right to attend the trial,
the court decided to wait for the Supreme Court to decide Richmond. Id. Globe appealed
to the Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment after Richmond,
and remanded. Id. On remand, the Massachusetts Supreme Judiciary Court decided
there was an exception to the "unbroken tradition of openness" when sex crimes and
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tim-witnesses. The lower court in Globe followed a Massachu-
setts law71 which required mandatory closure during criminal
trials of sexual abuse of children under the age of eighteen. The
media appealed the closure decision, challenging the law on
First Amendment grounds. Globe did not involve a particularly
sympathetic fact pattern for closure because the victims were
sixteen and seventeen, they purportedly agreed to an open trial,
and their names had already been released by the media.72
The Court held that while the media's right to attend a
criminal trial established in Richmond Newspapers73 was not ab-
solute, the circumstances under which the media and public
could be barred were limited.74 In order to succeed on a request
for closure and overcome the presumption of an open trial75 the
state must advance a compelling interest that is narrowly tai-
lored to meet the interests the state is protecting.76 Although
the Court concluded that safeguarding the psychological well-
being of a child was a compelling state interest, this interest
alone did not justify mandatory closure. The Court ruled that
decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis.77
The Globe Court never precluded closure, but simply dealt
with the circumstances of a specific case. The Court stated,
We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one: that a rule of mandatory
closure respecting the testimony of minor sex victims is constitutionally
infirm. In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the
First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion
from the courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony
of minor sex-offense victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no particu-
larized determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional.7
Two years after Globe, the Court addressed the media's
right to attend pre-trial proceedings, specifically the voir dire. In
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press /),79 the Court
children are involved. Id. Globe appealed again and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari. Id. at 598-602.
71. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 16A (1981).
72. Globe, 457 U.S. at 608-09.
73. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
74. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 606-07 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982); Smith v. Daily
Mail Pubrg Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
77. Id. at 607-08.
78. Id. at 611 n.27.
79. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). In Press I, the defendant in the underlying action was tried
and convicted of raping and murdering a teenage girl. Id. at 503. Before the trial, the
media requested that the voir dire remain open to the public. Id. The prosecutor opposed
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found that voir dire proceedings had enjoyed a presumption of
openness in the past and, citing Globe, found that an overriding
interest must be shown to allow closure.80 Although the interests
advanced-a defendant's right to a fair trial and a juror's right
to privacy-were sufficient to warrant closure, there were no
findings supporting the conclusion that an open proceeding
would interfere with those rights.81 Furthermore, the trial court
failed to consider alternatives.82
Two years later in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court
(Press 1),83 the Court put to rest any confusion over whether
closure for pre-trial proceedings was to be treated differently
than closure for trials. The Court found that as long as the pro-
ceeding, to which the media sought access, had historically been
open to the publicM and that "public access play[ed] a significant
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in ques-
tion,"85 then a First Amendment right to attend the proceedings
attached.
86
The Court concluded that preliminary hearings were tradi-
tionally open to the public and that the hearings are sufficiently
like a trial to conclude that the public played a positive role by
attending.87 Accordingly, there is a First Amendment right that
attaches to attendance at a preliminary hearing.8 8 The Court
pointed out, however, that although a First Amendment right
attached, this right is not absolute and must be weighed against
the motion. Id. The judge held that the general voir dire would be open to the public
and the individual voir dire would be closed. Id. The voir dire lasted for six weeks and
only three days were open to the public. Id. After the selection of the jury the media re-
quested the transcripts, but this request was denied. Id. at 503-04. After the defendant
was convicted and sentenced, the media reapplied for the transcripts, and the request
was once again denied. Id. The Court granted certiorarL Id. at 505.
80. Press I, 464 US. at 510.
81. Id. at 510-11.
82. Id. For example, the judge could have required each juror to make an affirma-
tive request for an in camera hearing if they felt their answers were too personal for
open court. Id. at 512.
83. 478 U.S. 1 (1986). In Press II, the defendant in the underlying action was
charged with twelve counts of murder. Id. at 3. A preliminary hearing was held, and the
defendant moved for closure. Id. The judge granted the unopposed motion citing prejudi-
cial publicity. Id. at 4. The preliminary hearing continued for 41 days, resulting in the
defendant being held to answer on all charges. Id. The media requested the transcripts,
but this request was denied. Id. at 5. At some point during the appeals, the defendant
waived his right to a jury trial and the transcript was released. Id.
84. Press II, 478 U.S. at 8.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 11-12.
88. Id. at 13.
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the rights of the defendant.8 9 But the Court found that no over-
riding interest was advanced to overcome this right, and the
judgment was reversed. 90
2. Standards Used to Weigh Interests and Rights. Globe,
Richmond, Press I and Press II provided the lower courts with
factors to consider when deciding whether to close courtrooms.
The right to an open trial is a shared right of the public and the
defendant 9' and protected by the First and Sixth Amendments
respectively. To prevail on a closure motion the party must ad-
vance an overriding interest to overcome the presumption of
openness. 92 Which rights are balanced depends on which trial
participant-the state or the defendant-makes the motion for
closure, and which participant challenges the motion-the
state',93 the defendant or the media.94
If the state or child moves to close the courtroom, and the
media objects, then the media must establish a First Amend-
ment right to attend the proceeding. Similarly, if the defendant
moves for closure, and the media objects, it must establish a
First Amendment right to be present, which the defendant may
overcome. 95
Specifically, there are several procedures for a court to fol-
low when deciding whether to close a trial:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding in-
terest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher val-
ues and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court
can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. 6
In other words, a court must find97 that the state (or the
89. Id.
90. Id. at 15.
91. Id. at 7.
92. An overriding interest must be presented whether the party is moving pursuant
to the First or Sixth Amendments. Id. at 9-10; Waller v. Georgia, 467 US. 39, 47 (1984).
93. For these purposes the state represents the child's interests.
94. United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 1995).
95. The last possibility is that the state or child move for closure and only the
defendant objects, in which case, a First Amendment right would not attach. The state
or child must advance an overriding interest in light of the Sixth Amendment.
96. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Ca., 464 US. 501, 510 (1984); see also
Press II, 478 U.S. at 9-10; Waller, 467 U.S. at 45; Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 382 (1979).
97. The judge's findings must support closure and be placed on the record. See Press
1, 464 U.S. at 513; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 US. 555, 580-81 (1980);
Herald Co. v. Kepfer, 734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984); People v. Kline, 494 N.W2d 756 (Mich.
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defendant)98 have articulated an overriding interest that may be
prejudiced,99 that there are no alternatives, 100 and that the clo-
sure is narrowly tailored to the interest being protected. 10 1 In
addition, the public must be notified, in advance, of the court's
intention to partially or completely close the trial,10 2 and the me-
dia must be given the opportunity, in a hearing, to challenge
whether closure is proper. When children are involved, the trial
judge is advised to look at the child's "age, psychological matur-
ity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of
the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives."10 3 Finally,
many lower courts have concluded that when a court decides to
only partially close' ° a trial, the standard to overcome the pre-
Ct. App. 1992); Renkel v. State, 807 P.2d 1087 (Ala. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Klein, 438
N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1989); State v. Suttles, No. CCA 76, 1987 WL 17248, *4 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Sept. 21, 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 767 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. 1989); State v.
Hightower, 376 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); see generally William K. Meyer,
Evaluating Court Closures After Richmond Newspapers: Using Sixth Amendment Stan-
dards to Enforce a irst Amendment Right, 50 GEO. WASH. L REV. 304, 312 (1982) (dis-
cussing standards used to justify closure of trials).
98. It is unlikely the media will argue for a closed trial unless they were a party to
the action.
99. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45; Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982) (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 US. 45, 53-54 (1982)); Richmond, 448 US. at
580-81; State v. Gusdardo, 605 A.2d 217, 219-20 (N.H. 1992). In order for a defendant to
overcome the presumption of openness he needs to show that there will be a reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice. Press IT, 478 US. at 14.
100. Press II, 478 US. at 14; Press I, 464 US. at 511; Waller, 467 US. 39; Rich-
mond, 448 U.S. at 580-81; Woods v. Kuhlman, 977 F.2d. 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 1987); Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93; Guajardo,
605 A.2d at 220; Ostolaza v. Warden, 603 A-2d 768, 775 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
101. See Waller, 467 US. at 48; Press I, 464 US. at 510; Globe, 457 US. at 607;
Woods, 977 F.2d at 77; United States v. Galloway, 963 F.2d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1991);
In re South Carolina Press Ass'n, 946 F.2d 1037, 1040 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1989); CBS, Inc. v. US. Dist. Ct. for the Cent.
Dist. of Cal., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985); Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532
(11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Jacobson, 785 F. Supp. 563, 568 (E.D. Va. 1992);
United States v. Milken, 780 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Kline, 494 N.W2d at 759;
see Suttles, 1987 WL 17248, at *5 (discussing a "limited and partial closing"); cf Globe,
457 US. at 615 (Burger, J., dissenting) (suggesting that compelling government interests
and narrow tailoring are inappropriate, rigid standards); see also Meyer, supra note 97,
at 312-13 (discussing generally that closure orders are limited to the affected parties and
portion of the proceeding); Symposium, supra note 57, at 297-98.
102. See, eg., Jacobson, 785 F. Supp. at 566; Raffoul, 826 F2d at 222; Herald Co.,
734 F.2d at 102.
103. Globe, 457 US. at 608.
104. Partial closure is either complete closure of the courtroom during only the vic-
tim-witness's testimony or complete closure to only certain members of the public, except
for the defendant's family and the press. Complete closure is closure of the courtroom to
every individual, except the witness, judge, jury, defendant, court officers and attorneys
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sumption is lower, and thus a substantial state interest is
sufficient. 0 5
3. Child Custody Proceedings.05 The Supreme Court has
not ruled that First Amendment rights attach to child custody
cases or family law proceedings. As there is no support for a
finding that family court proceedings have been historically
open to the public10 7 nor that the public's presence plays any
positive role by attending, no First Amendment right should at-
tach. Furthermore, because the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are no longer implicated, neither are the policies support-
ing the need for an open trial.0B Moreover, family disputes,
which are considered private matters, are involved.10 9 Also, it
should not be overlooked that although custody proceedings ad-
dress the parental rights to children, there are often allegations
of sexual and physical abuse, therefore, the concern regarding
the effect on children of openly litigating their abuse still re-
mains. Accordingly, the media should not be permitted to attend
family court proceedings.
In New York, two court cases brought the issue of closure
during family court proceedings to the forefront.10 In Matter of
R.R, KM., T.L., C.L., and R.L.A and Brentrup v. Culkin,112 the
during the entire trial.
105. United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 546 (10th Cir. 1991); Sherlock, 962
F.2d at 1357-58; Wainwright, 714 F.2d at 1539; Kine, 494 N.W.2d at 759-60. This conclu-
sion is in accordance with the Court's statement that limitations on closure that resem-
ble "time, place, and manner" do not require strict scrutiny. Globe, 457 US. at 607 n.17.
106. Access to family law proceedings varies from state to state. This Article will fo-
cus only on New York. Apparently, only in Florida are all family court proceedings open
to the public. See Alan Findler, Chief Judge in New York Opens Family Courts for Rou-
tine Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1997, at B7.
107. For example, in New York, the opposite is true. In 1922, the law provided that
the public "may" be excluded from the courtroom. This language was changed to "shall"
in the 1930s. See Gary Spencer, Family Court Matters Open to the Public, Press, N.Y.
LJ., June 16, 1997, at 1. The language was once again amended to "may" in 1961, how-
ever, courts continued to close family court proceedings. Id.
108. See supra notes 35-50 and the accompanying text. Put simply, there is no
longer a necessity that the public serve as a watch dog on the treatment of the
defendant.
109. See Timothy M. Tippins, Should Family Court Proceedings be Presumptively
Open?, STATE BAR NEws, SeptJOct. 1997, at 7 ("Intimate and often vile domestic detail is
common fare in the Family Court .... [w]hy should our citizens lose all right to privacy
simply because they bear the misfortune of domestic disharmony?").
110. The recent circumstances surrounding family court proceedings in New York
also lend support to. the concern that the media is increasingly gaining access to pro-
ceedings involving children.
111. N.Y. LJ., Dec. 13, 1995, at 30.
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trial courts denied motions to close their courtrooms. Both deci-
sions were appealed to the First Department of the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, and both trials were stayed
pending those decisions.1
13
The Matter of R.R. involved the highly publicized case of
Elisa Izquierdo, that brought New York City's entire child pro-
tective system under attack. Elisa was a six-year-old girl beaten
to death by her mother, who had a history of abusive behavior
towards her children. Elisa's mother pled guilty'14 and the Mat-
ter of R.R. addressed the child protective proceedings of Elisa's
siblings. The decision to keep these proceedings open to the me-
dia was appealed. On appeal, the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, reversed the lower court's ruling and barred the me-
dia from attending the family court proceedings.1 5 Furthermore,
the court allowed the children's lawyer to submit affidavits from
the children, under seal, to substantiate the closure."
6
Culkin involved the child custody dispute between Macaulay
Culki's parents. Macaulay is a child movie star featured in
such movies as Home Alone and The Good Son. The proceeding
addressed the custody of Macaulay and his five siblings, ages six
through seventeen." 7 The guardian ad litem, appointed to repre-
sent the interests of the children, moved to have the proceedings
closed to the public and the records sealed."8 The parents joined
in the request." 9 The lower court, although agreeing to seal the
records, denied the request to close the proceedings finding that
the parties had not shown that the children would be harmed.120
Once again, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court's
ruling.'21 The court based its decision on a statute permitting
112. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 1995, at 26 (citing Brentrup v. Culkin, 166 Misc.2d 870 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1995), rev'd, 223 A.D.2d 294 (1st Dep't 1996)).
113. David A. Schulz & Carolyn 1L Foley, Child Protective Proceedings: Open 7b The
Public?, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 1996, at S2.
114. John Sullivan, Stepfather Is Sentenced to Prison in Abuse of Girl Who Later
Died, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996 at B3 (Elisas stepfather pled guilty to attempted assault
in the second degree for banging Elisa's head against a wall three weeks before her
mother killed Elisa. The stepfather was sentenced to one and a half years in prison.
Elisa's mother was sentenced to 15 years to life.).
115. Matter of Reben I., 641 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1st Dept. 1996)); Daniel Wise, Hearing
on Neglect Closed to Reporters, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 24, 1996, at 1.
116. Wise, supra note 115.




121. Id.; The Court of Appeals has refused to hear the appeal; accordingly the Ap-
pellate Division's decision stands. Court of Appeals Refuses to Hear Culkin-Case, N.Y.
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closure, and several affidavits provided to the court by psycholo-
gists and school officials involved with the children, showing
that the children would suffer from the exposure.122 Further-
more, the court found there was no reasonable justification for
this type of proceeding to be open to the media, other than curi-
osity and media ratings.
Subsequent to these two cases, however, New York's top
state court officials declared that Family Court must be open to
the media and the public. 1m Although statutorily family court
matters were already open to the public, courts had consistently
kept them closed. 124 Accordingly, the officials adopted new
rules'25 that allow closure only when warranted to protect chil-
dren from harm. 6 Practically speaking, although the courtroom
is intended to be open, as the two examples demonstrate, judges
will continue to close courtrooms when children could be harmed
or their privacy interests are implicated.
B. The Right to Televise Legal Proceedings?27
Although the print media has a right to attend legal pro-
ceedings, this right does not, and should not, extend to the pres-
ence of cameras in the courtroom.
Recently, the landscape of statutes permitting cameras in
the courtroom has changed. In 1965, 48 states had statutes or
court rules precluding cameras in the courtroomm whereas to-
day, Court TV has access to courtrooms in 47 states. 9 This has
LJ. Feb. 7, 1997.
122. Matter of P.B., N.Y. LJ., Sept. 23, 1996, at 25.
123. Alan Finder, Chief Judge in New York Opens Family Courts for Routine Cases,
N.Y. Tms, June 19, 1997, at 1; Gary Spencer, Family Court Matters Open to Public,
Press, N.P. LJ., June 19, 1997, at 1.
124. Spencer, supra note 123, at 1.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. For a history of televising trials see Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981);
Carolyn Stewart Dyer & Nancy R. Hauserman, Electronic Coverage of the Courts: Excep.
tion to Exposure, 75 GEo. LJ. 1633 (1987); Richard P. Lindsey, An Assessment of the Use
of Cameras in State and Federal Courts, 18 GA. L Rv. 389 (1984); Carolyn E. Reimer,
Television Coverage of Trials: Constitutional Protection Against Absolute Denial of Access
in the Absence of a Compelling Right, 30 Viu L REV. 1267 (1985); Shartel, supra note
4; David N. Kuriyama, Note, The -Right- of Information Trangle: A Frst Amendment
Basis for Televising Judicial Proceedings, 4 U. HAw. I. Rav. 85 (1982).
128. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965); Larry V. Starcher, Cameras in the
Courtroom-A Revival in West Virginia and the Nation, 84 W. VA. L. Rav. 267, 269
(1982).
129. Shartel, supra note 4; Robert G. Morillo, Television and the Public Trial, N.Y.
LJ., Apr 1, 1997, at 3; Massimo Calabresi, Swaying the Home Jury, TIME, Jan. 10, 1994,
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led to a surge in the number of televised trials, including many
high-proffie trials such as the Menendez, Bobbitt, William Ken-
nedy Smith, Louise Woodward and O.J. Simpson trials. Even
foreign countries have requested video of some of these trials,
presumably to televise it.130 As this trend toward televising tri-
als continues, the question of closure becomes increasingly im-
portant as the American public is able to see a variety of trials
at any time, resulting in both negative and positive effects.
1. Landscape of the Law Regarding Televising Trials. In
1981, in Chandler v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court
failed to recognize a right to televise trials.'3' However, noting
the many safeguards Florida enacted to protect the defendant
and other witnesses, the Court stated it would not intervene
3 2
in a State's decision to allow cameras in courtrooms.
Prior to Chandler, the photographic and radio media were
excluded from both federal and state courtrooms. 33 At that time,
most states had adopted the American Bar Association's ("ABA!)
Canon 35 excluding the media,3 which was amended in 1952 to
at 56.
Court T. has its own self-policing guidelines-it does not broadcast testimony of a
witness less than twelve years old or if the material involves personal matters, like child
abuse. Pate, infra note 137, at 357. However, Court TV. has televised a trial involving a
twelve-year-old boy in a divorce case. Id. at 357-58. To determine what it televises,
'[sleveral factors are considered .... They include: how important and interesting the
issues in the case are; the newsworthiness of the case and the people involved; the qual-
ity and educational value of the trial, and the expected length of the trial. See Court TV
Website, Feb. 1, 1998, <http//www.courtly.com/about/ctvfaq.html> (on file with the author
and the Buffalo Law Review).
130. Entertainment bnight, Jan. 10, 1994, reported that Switzerland, Germany and
Italy have requested television footage of the Bobbitt trial.
131. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981) (the Court concluded that Estes
never "announced ... a constitutional rule barring still photographic, radio, and televi-
sion coverage in all cases under all circumstances"). See also Estes, 381 U.S. at 539-40
(the First Amendment does not provide the media with the right to televise a trial be-
cause the media interferes with the defendant's right to due process and a fair trial);
United States v. Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kerley, 753
F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 752 F2d 16 (2d Cim 1984); United
States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Torres, 602 F. Supp.
1458 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
132. Chandler, 449 US. at 576-77.
133. See Starcher, supra note 128, at 267-69 (explaining the exclusion applied to all
state courts except Colorado and Texas).
134. Id. The Canon originally read:
Proceedings in the court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or re-
cesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calcu-
lated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court
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exclude cameras, from the courtroom. Canon 3A(7) (which is a
renamed version of Canon 35), was amended in 1982 to permit
television coverage in the judge's discretion.135 Then in 1990, the
Canon was deleted altogether, because the ABA concluded the
Canon did not address ethical issues.136 By that time, most
states had adopted statutes allowing cameras in the court-
room. 3 7 Although federal courts are statutorily prohibited from
and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and
should not be permitted.
Id.
135. Id.
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing in
courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto during session of court, or
recesses between sessions, except that under rules prescribed by a supervising
appellate court or other appropriate authority, a judge may authorize broad-
casting, televising, recording or photographing of judicial proceedings in court-
rooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto consistent with the right of the
parties to a fair trial and subject to express conditions, limitations and guide-
lines which allow such coverage in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not
distract the trial participants, and will not otherwise interfere with the admin-
istration of justice.
Id. See also WARREN FREED AN, PRESS AND MEDIA ACCESS TO THE CRanNAL CoURmoom
48 (1988); Strickland & Moore, supra note 13, at 133.
136. Kathe Aschenbrenner Pate, Comment, Restricting Electronic Media Coverage of
Child-Witnesses: A Proposed Rule, 1993 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 347, 352 (1993).
137. In January, 1977, three states permitted cameras in the courtroom. By 1981,
thirty-four states allowed cameras. Starcher, supra note 128, at 267-69. Now, forty-seven
states allow cameras in the courtroom. Robert G. Morrillo, Television and the Public
Trial, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 1, 1997, at 3; Massimo Calabresi, Swaying the Home Jury, TIME,
Jan. 10, 1994, at 56; Strickland & Moore, supra note 13, at 133. The statutes are as fol-
lows: AIA. CANONS OF JuD. ETHIcs, Canon 3(AX7) (1996); ALASKA RULES GOvERNING THE
ADmNITRATION OF ALL Crs. Rule 50 (1997); AR Sup. CT. RULES Rule 81, Canon 3(AX7)
(1997); In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 609 S.W.2d 28, 30 (1980); CAL GEN. RULES ApPCABLE
TO ALL Crs. 980 (Aug. 1, 1997); CoLD. CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 3(AX7) (1990); CONN.
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(AX7) (1997); DE. JUDGES' CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon
3(AX7) (1997); FLMA CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 3(AX7) (1994); GA. UNIFORM SUPER. CT.
RULES Rule 22 (1997); HAw. Sup. CT. RULE 5.1-5.2, published in . OF SUP. Or. OF HAW.
vol. 2, at 26 (1987); IDAHO CODE OF JuD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(7) (1997); ILL. SUP. CT.
RULES Rule 63, Canon 3(AX7) (1997); IOWA CODE OF Jun. CoNDucT Canon 3(AX7) (1996);
KAN. CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 3(AX7) (1997); Ky. Sup. Or. RULES Rule 4.300, Canon
3A(7) (1997); LA. CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 3(AX9) (1997); ME. RULES OF COURT Ad-
ministrative Order in Regard to Photographic and Electronic Coverage of the Courts, 66
A.2d XXV (1982); MD. RULES Rule 16-109 (1997); MASS. RULES OF THE Sup. JuD. CT. Rule
3:09, Canon 3(AX7) (1997); MICH. CODE OF Jun. CoNDuCT Canon 3(AX7) (1997); MINN.
CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(7) (1997); In re Canon 35, 176 Mont. xxiii (1978);
NEB. Sup. CT. RULES 8.1-.3 (1986); NEV. SuP. CT. RULES Part IV, Rules 229-247 (1997);
NIL Sup. CT. RULES Rule 19 (1997); NIL SUPER. Or. RULES, Rule 78 (1994); NIL Diar. &
MUN. CT. RULEs Rule 1.4 (1995); NJ. CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 3(AX9) (1997); NM.
Sup. CT. GEN. RULES Rule 23-107 (1997); N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF JUDGE §§ 29.1-.4
(1997); N.C. GEN. RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE SUPE. AND DiSr. Coum Rule 15 (1997);
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allowing cameras in courtrooms during criminal trials, civil tri-
als are not covered by statute and each circuit is permitted to
adopt Local Rules addressing this issue.m
2. Are There Advantages to Allowing Cameras in the
Courtroom? One frequently advanced reason to support cameras
in the courtroom is their ability to replace the public's presence
in the courtroom, because, arguably, the public does not attend
trials as frequently as in the past.13 9 Recall that many of the
protections provided by an open trial require the public's pres-
ence.140 On one hand, however, it is not necessary for the televi-
sion media to broadcast a trial in order to inform the public. Af-
ter all, the media may report what it can access, 141 and it
usually has complete access to the trial records. 142 Accordingly,
N.). ADMImu TIV RULES AND ORDERS Rule 21 (1996); ND. RULES OF CRas PROCEDURE
Rule 53 (1996); NJ). RULES OF COURT Rule 10.1 (1996); RULES OF PRACTICE OF THE SuP.
CT. OF OHIO RULES Rule 17 (1997); RULES OF SUERINTENDENCE FOR THE CTS. OF OHIO
Rules 11-12 (1997); OKLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(7) (1997); OR. UNIFORM
TRIAL CT. RULES 3.180 (1997); PA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(AX7) (1997); RIL Sup.
CT. RULES Article VII (1997); TENN. SUP. CT. RULES Rule 10, Canon 3(AX7) (1995); TEx
LOCAL RULES OF THE CT. OF APPEASA Rule IX (1997); UTAH RULES OF JUD. ADmNISTRATION
Rule 4-401 (1997); VT. RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 35 (1988); VA. RULES OF CT.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2-266 (1996); WASH. RULES OF GEN. APPLICATION Rule 16
(1996); Wis. SUP. CT. RULES 61.02-.12 (1996); Wyo. RULES OF CRmIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule
53 (1996). See Dyer & Hauserman, supra note 127.
138. See supra note 4.
139. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 US. 555, 572 (1980) ("attendance
at court is no longer a widespread pastime"). There are contradictory views regarding
the proper role of the media now that the public does not attend criminal trials with any
frequency or consistency. It is established that the right to attend a criminal trial is not
simply the media's right but the publi's right; in fact the press has no greater right to
attend a trial than the public. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 584 (1965) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). The ideal situation is to have the public attend the trial in order to fulfill
the intended purposes of an open trial. See supra Part LB. Some courts find that the
media is not supposed to take on the role of the public and attend the trial in lieu of the
public. See United States v. Torres, 602 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Common-
wealth v. Contakos, 453 A.2d 578 (Pa. 1982). Cf Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532,
1542-43 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Holveck, 565 N.E.2d 919 (Il. 1990). However, there is
support in the United States Supreme Court for the notion that the media should act as
a "surrogate for the public." Richmond, 448 U.S. at 573. The public does not have the
time in this modern age to attend trials; therefore, the media should attend them and
inform the public of what it is missing, so as to "give meaning to those explicit guaran-
tees" such as ensuring the defendant is not unjustly condemned. Id. at 575; see also
Freedman, supra note 135, at 12.
140. See supra, Part LB.
141. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
142. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 615 (1982) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
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because attendance at trials does not give the media any addi-
tional information,"4 it serves no purpose by attending.
On the other hand, ideally, broadcasting trials could serve
some of the purposes and provide some of the protections of an
open trial.'" For example, the viewer could judge the witness's
demeanor and credibility. Similarly, television would provide the
forum whereby viewers are alerted to the testimony of a witness
so that if the testimony is false the viewer can come forward
and inform the court;1" or any viewer having additional infor-
mation about that trial can come forward."4 Viewers can also
observe the judge and attorneys to ensure that they are per-
forming their jobs adequately. 4 By watching, viewers become
more educated as to the workings of the judicial system'4 and
ideally their confidence in the system increases. 149 Finally,
through television the public is ensured that justice is done.150
However, in reality, broadcasting trials does not fulfill these
purposes and may even result in negative effects. As opposed to
viewing a trial in a courtroom, viewers only see what the cam-
era sees; they are subject to what is seen through the camera's
lens and how it is seen, including through close-ups, shots from
different angles or only one angle. Hence, unable to view all the
participants at the same time or any one participant continu-
ously, viewers are not equipped to judge a witness's demeanor,
or the actions of the judge and attorneys.
Moreover, it is likely that in most cases the television net-
143. Critics have remarked that the television media wants access to courtrooms
solely to increase its ratings. Television stations are usually interested only in the most
heinous crimes or those trials where celebrities or public officials are involved. This is
why the term "media circus! is often employed. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 US. 660
(1981) (trials are televised not to educate but to "titillate); SUSANNA BARBER, NEWS CAM-
ERAS iN TnE COURROOM: A FREE PRESS--FREE TRiAL DEBATE 33 (1987); The Honorable
Alfred T. Goodwin, Preface to SUSANNA BARBER, NEWS CAMERAs iN THE CoURTRoOM: A
Faaa PREss-FAIR TRL DEBATE ix, x (1987); Hearn, supra note 24; Pate, supra note 136,
at 348; Radin, supra note 13; Steven Keeva, Circus-Like Tial Colors Expectation, ABA
J., Nov. 1995, at 48c; Henry J. Reske, Courtroom Cameras Face New Scrutiny, ABA J.,
Nov. 1995, at 48d; Floyd Abrams & Wendy Kaminer, Cameras in the Courtroom, ABA
J., Sept. 1995, at 36-37.
144. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980); cf. Sympo-
sium, supra note 56, at 293.
145. See supra notes 38-40.
145. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text; Gregory K. McCall, Cameras in
the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1546, 1559-60
(1985).
149. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
150. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
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work will broadcast only parts of the trial, 151 or simply
soundbites. Thus, once again, viewers are unable to judge the
witnesses' credibility and demeanor or ensure that the judge
and attorneys are doing their jobs. Therefore, viewers cannot de-
termine whether the defendant was given a fair trial. Accord-
ingly, the public's confidence and sense that justice is served
may not improve. In fact, these sentiments may be harmed as
the public may conclude, based on the brief parts it saw, that
justice was not served. In addition, if viewers do not see the
whole trial, the education received about the judicial system is
minimal.15 2
Finally, if only those trials that involve morbid details or ce-
lebrities are televised, the viewer will not be educated as to the
entire system. Because the television media often broadcasts
programs for the ratings it predicts will result, this is a likely
possibility.5 3 Critics argue convincingly that the television me-
dia does not televise trials to ensure the protections of an open
trial or to educate the public.154 If a viewer did watch an entire
trial, as was envisioned by the ideal of open trials, televising tri-
als may, at least, provide education, and at most, the protec-
tions of open trials. However, in light of the reality of televised
trials and the negative effects it may have, cameras serve little
purpose in the courtroom.
3. The Impact of Television on Legal Proceedings.55 In ad-
dition to the negative impact televised trials can have on the
151. Critics of television in the courts note that because of time constraints,
'gavel to gavel" coverage is virtually unworkable. They suggest that, except
for trials which possess extraordinary voyeuristic appeal, coverage is
economicall [sic] uninviting. Whatever may be the reasons, it does appear
that even in the states where cameras are permitted in the courtrooms, the
public sees little of the product on the evening news.
Goodwin, supra note 143.
152. Some authors conclude that due to the minimal coverage there is no real edu-
cation to be gained from televising trials. Gardner, supra note 43, at 491 (in Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) only 2 minutes and 55 seconds were ever played on
television).
153. The Honorable Robert M. Takasugi, Jury Selection in a High-Profile Case:
United States v. Delorean, 40 Am. U. L REV. 837, 837 (1991); Bill Carter, Watching the
Watchers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at D1.
154. See supra note 151; Carter, supra note 153 (the revenues received by television
networks to support their programming "are directly linked to the numbers of viewers
that stations, networks and cable channels can reliably produce.). Therefore, networks
and other channels must broadcast programming that will attract viewers if they want
to survive financially.
155. This Section relies on studies and conclusions in BARBER, supra note 143, as
the most comprehensive and recent research done in this area. See also Norbert L. Kerr,
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public, television may also have a negative impact on the trial
participants. The Supreme Court first addressed television's im-
pact on courtroom proceedings in Estes v. Texas.156 The Court
concluded that the impact of cameras on the participants in the
courtroom and on the fairness of the proceedings, deprived the
defendant of due process.15 7
First, the Estes Court found that the presence of television
cameras could adversely impact the jury.15 8 Jurors, aware of the
broadcast, may feel that they are judging a more important
trial, leading to the possibility of prejudice, and pressure to de-
cide the case the way the public advocates. 5 9 Although one re-
searcher notes that "[n]early [fifty percent of the jury] said cam-
eras made the case seem more important"y60 she concludes that
jurors are generally unaware of the camera's presence and,
therefore, this concern is unfounded.
16 '
The Estes Court further found that jurors could become pre-
occupied with how they look and appear, 6 2 and therefore more
interested in knowing when the camera is viewing them than
with hearing the testimony. This, in turn, affects the verdict and
the fairness of the trial.163 Not only has one researcher con-
cluded that this concern is unfounded,164 but this possibility can
be alleviated, as in the O.J. Simpson case, by precluding the
jury from being taped.
According to the Estes Court, the jurors may also disobey
the court's directions and watch the broadcast on television. 65
This is problematic because if a juror reviews only portions of
the trial, those portions that are rebroadcast would be reempha-
The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors, JUDICATURE, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 120-27 (citing
Carroll & Kerr, et al., Free Press & Fair Trial: The Role of Behavioral Research, 10 LAw
& Hu. BEHAV. 187-202 (1986)).
156. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
157. Id. at 535.
158. Id. at 545.
159. Id.; see also Lindsey, supra note 127, at 404-05.
160. BARBER, supra note 143, at 73.
161. BARBER, supra note 143, at 72-73.
162. Estes, 381 U.S. at 546.
163. Id.
164. Barber cites several results: between fifty percent and seventy percent of the
jurors surveyed said they were not distracted. Although fifty percent of the jurors were
aware of the media, seventy-five percent said they did not feel self-conscious, and eighty
percent said they were able to concentrate. BARBER, supra note 143, at 73.
165. Estes, 381 US. at 546; Goodwin, supra note 143; Lindsey, supra note 127, at
404; Symposium, supra note 57, at 293; see also Walter Goodman, Court TV: Case of the
Curious Witness, N.Y. TamES, July 21, 1997, at C15 (mistrial declared when witness ad-
mitted to viewing another witness's testimony on Court TV, prior to testifying).
[Vol. 46242
BARRING THE MEDIA
sized to the juror.166 The juror might then place more impor-
tance on those portions.167 In addition, due to the publicity of a
televised trial, jurors may be more interested in writing about
their experience than concentrating on the defendant.
Finally, retrials would be affected if there was wide public-
ity of a trial.168 In highly publicized cases, it might be very diffi-
cult to find a juror who did not hear of or see testimony from
the previous trial, as evidenced by the retrial of the Menendez
brothers.
Witnesses also may be impacted by a televised trial169 and
like the jury, react inappropriately to being filmed. The witness
could become "demoralized," "frightened," "cocky," "embar-
rassed," or tend to "overdramatize" 170 Any such feelings would
affect the accuracy of the testimony 7 Moreover, the camera's
presence may affect the witness's demeanor.7 2 The witness may
feel nervous and therefore look nervous. The jury may then
question the witness's credibility and disregard the testimony.173
Once again, this may lead to a deprivation of the defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial. 74 On the other hand, if a wit-
ness knows there is a larger audience this may reduce the possi-
bility of peijury.
The witness might also watch portions of the trial on televi-
sion before testifying.175 This could affect the witness's testi-
mony, or in some cases, a decision not to testify at all.176 The
witness may fear being "ostracized" by the community as a re-
sult of testifying,177 or the witness may learn that evidence will
be used to impeach the witness. 78 If the evidence is something
the witness does not want revealed to the community, the wit-
166. Goodwin, supra note 143; Lindsey, supra note 127, at 405.
167. Estes, 381 U.S. at 546; but see Matthew T Crosson, Cameras in the Courtrooms
Do Not Adversely Affect Conduct of Court Proceedings, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 1991, at 40 (if
jurors do disobey the court's instructions it is better that they see the coverage of the
trial on television than read a reporter's interpretation of what occurred at the trial).
168. Estes, 381 US. at 546.
169. Id. at 547.
170. Id.
171. McCall, supra note 148, at 1552.
172. Id. at 1552-55.
173. Id. at 1554.
174. FREEDMAN, supra note 135, at 49; McCall, supra note 148, at 1552, 1555.
175. Estes, 381 US. at 547; see also Symposium, supra note 57, at 294; Abraham
Abramovsky, Gag Orders and Prior Restraint, N.Y. LJ., May 6, 1993, at 3; Goodman,
supra note 165.
176. Estes, 381 U.S. at 547; FREEDMAN, supra note 135, at 49.
177. McCall, supra note 148, at 1553.
178. Id. at 1554.
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ness may decide not to testify.179 These circumstances may affect
not only the witness who already agreed to testify but also the
potential witness.8 0 Once again a defendant's right to a fair
trial would be compromised.
Indeed, one researcher found that witnesses are most ad-
versely affected by televised trials; "[w]itnesses had mixed, often
negative attitudes toward camera coverage." 81 The study
showed three quarters of the witnesses were intimidated,
182
eighty percent of the witnesses were aware of the camera, and
between seventy-one percent and forty-seven percent were
slightly or somewhat self-conscious. 183 Between forty-seven per-
cent and forty-three percent were nervous, and fifty-nine per-
cent felt the presence of the media exaggerated the importance
of the case.'" The study also found that seventy-three percent of
the witnesses said they were not reluctant to testify even know-
ing that the camera was present. 1' Forty to fifty percent of the
attorneys said that the cameras affected their witnesses.85
Moreover, the Estes Court found the judge could be subject
to many of the same pressures as the jury and witnesses, partic-
ularly an elected judge. 87 The judge might feel publicly pres-
sured to rule a particular way. The judge could also be dis-
tracted and unable to hear portions of the testimony.188 It would
be increasingly difficult for the judge to ensure that the defend-
ant received a fair trial, due to distractions and possibilities of
prejudice. 89 The judge may also have increased administrative
burdens. 90 Furthermore, it may become difficult to keep control
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also Gardner, supra note 43, at 488.





186. Id. at 75.
187. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Gardner, supra note 43, at 490-91 (extra burdens such as hearings regard-
ing the media and special attention to the procedural issues of the case). See also
Takasugi, supra note 153, at 838-40, where the judge in the United States v. DeLorean
case described the extra administrative procedures he implemented in order to ensure
that the defendant received a fair trial, including, a continuance to allow press interest
to wane, forming a committee with media representatives, making rules with the com-
mittee about where the media would sit and how they would behave, providing an auxil-
iary room where the media would conjugate, giving the parties additional peremptory
challenges, liberally excusing jurors for cause, constantly telling the jurors not to watch
anything about the trial on television or to read anything in the newspapers and meet-
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of the trial with people entering, exiting and moving around the
courtroom.19l
One researcher concluded that judges generally are unaf-
fected by the cameras, often forgetting about their presence.
92
Some judges said they were actually encouraged to perform bet-
ter193 and others said it made judges better prepared.194 It is in-
teresting to note that even though judges were either neutral or
happy about the presence of cameras, only about fifty percent
wanted coverage to continue. 9 5 Their "lack of enthusiasm was
partly due to annoyance about additional supervisory duties,
congested hallways, and extra time and taxpayers' money asso-
ciated with camera coverage.
" 9 6
In addition, the defendant could be affected. Some argue tel-
evising the trial is akin to harassing the defendant; the "pres-
ence [of television] is a form of mental-if not physical-harass-
ment . . 197Televising a defendant's every move strips the
defendant of his dignity.198 The cameras could also distract the
defendant from concentrating on the case. 199 The defendant's
counsel might also be distracted, resulting in a less effective de-
fense.200 Although lawyers often act and play to a jury, there is
the possibility that counsel might enhance this role,201 caring
more about television appearances and attracting new clients
than about the defendant. In addition, the camera's presence
singles out the defendant on trial from all the other defendants
in the system, causing further prejudice.202 Finally, as noted,
any negative effects on any trial participants may prejudice the
defendant.
Additionally, the presence of television cameras detracts
from the dignity of the trial.20 3 "The sense of fairness, dignity
and integrity that all associate with the courtroom would be-
ing with jurors after the trial to tell them what to expect from the press.
191. Takasugi, supra note 153, at 838.
192. BARBER, supra note 143, at 75.
193. Id.
194. See Shartel, supra note 4 at 23.
195. BARBER, supra note 143, at 76.
196. Id.





202. Id. But see Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580-81 (1981), where the Court
stated that more experimentation was required before this point could be substantiated.




come lost with its commercialization."204
In 1981, the Court once again addressed the issue of cam-
eras in the courtroom in Chandler v. F/orida,2°5 voicing its skep-
ticism of the Estes Court's conclusions regarding the severity of
the psychological impact on the trial participants.2 6 The Chan-
dler Court concluded that evidence suggesting a psychological
impact on the participants of the trial was sparse27 and that
further research was required.
208
Although the degree of the impact of television on trial par-
ticipants and the system has been questioned, the above shows
there is undoubtedly an impact on some of the participants
which should outweigh any advantages of broadcasting a trial,
including those trials involving children.
Ill. COURTROOM CLOSURE i AN OPTION NECESSARY TO PROTECT
THE INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
A. Potential Harm to Children Who Testify
Child abuse is a serious and growing problem in our coun-
try. In 1974, 60,000 cases of child abuse were reported, which
number increased to 1.1 million in 1980 and more than doubled
to 2.4 million in the 1980s.29 From 1986 to 1993, "confirmed in-
cidents of abuse and neglect" once again doubled.2 10 Serious
physical abuse increased four hundred percent over those same
years.21 ' According to one study twenty-five per cent of all girls
204. Estes, 381 US. at 574.
205. 449 US. 560 (1981).
206. Id. at 578. The Court acknowledged that if psychological impact can be proven,
then a ban on television cameras in the courtroom is necessary. Id. at 575.
207. In addition to the aforementioned reasons to exclude cameras from the court-
room, another reason advanced by the Estes Court was the impact of the technology on
the participants. The Estes Court found that the increase in noise and lights in the
courtroom might distract the jury. Estes, 381 U.S. at 546. The validity of this concern is
seriously questioned due to technological advances made in the television industry since
the Estes decision. See Chandler, 449 US. at 576, BARBER, supra note 144, at 25, 36.
Often, courtrooms have facilities which require only one camera and one microphone, re-
ducing any distractions. Id. at 36.
208. Chandler, 449 US. at 575-76 & n.11. The studies in this area are still sparse
and inconclusive.
209. The Honorable Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child,
2000 AD.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen, in CHD TRAUMA 13, 14-
15 (Ann Wolbert Burgess, ed., 1992).
210. Joe Sexton, Child Abuse Ms Fewer in New York, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 10, 1996 at
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will be sexually abused before age eighteen,212 and these statis-
tics are for a crime that remains largely unreported.
2 1 3
Child abuse victims suffer a "variety of long term emotional,
behavioral, social and sexual problems," including headaches,
sleep disorders, depression, suicide attempts and drug abuse.
2 14
Many sex abuse victims are also beaten and psychologically
threatened.215 These problems can lead to "severe psychological
harm" if a child is forced to testify in front of an abuser and the
public.216 The entire trial process, including "insensitive interac-
212. Christine A. Grant, Sexually Exploiting Children: Assessing Competency to Tes-
tify, in CHnLD TRAUMA I 3, supra note 209, at 213. Another study shows that the preva-
lence of child abuse has risen anywhere between 6% and 62% for girls, and between 3%
and 31% for boys. Id.
213. Id. at 214; Ann Wolbert Burgess, Introduction to C~m~ TRAUMA I, supra note
209, at xv;, Susan Howell Evans, Note, Criminal Procedure-Closed Circuit Television in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Keeping the Balance Between Realism and Idealism-Mary-
land v. Craig, 26 WAxE FOREST L. Ra-. 471, 477 (1991). Other statistics include:
"[b]etween 1976 and 1985, the reported incidence of sex abuse per 10,000 children
skyrocketed from less than 1% to 17.9%. Id. at 476 & n.57. One out of every three fe-
male adults is sexually abused as a child. Id. at 476 & n.58. Finally, only 24% of the re-
ported crime of child sexual abuse result in criminal action. Id. at 477 & n.63; see also
Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innova-
tions, 98 HARv. L REy. 806 (1985) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
Death from child abuse is also increasing. Sexton, supra note 204 (describing a de-
crease in death from child abuse in New York which is "counter to the trend nation-
wide"). "Across the country, child-abuse fatalities increased by almost forty percent from
1985 to 1991, according to the National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse, and have
held roughly steady since then at about 1,250 a year." Id.
214. Burgess, supra note 213, at xv.
215. Susan J. Kelley, Stress Responses of Children and Parents to Sexual Abuse and
Ritualistic Abuse in Day Care Centers, in Cmw TRAA I, supra note 209, at 231, 251.
216. Susan Cohn, Note, Protecting Child Rape Victims From the Public and Press
After Globe Newspaper Co. and Cox Broadcasting, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 269, 269 &
nn.2-3 (1983). See DAvID FHImLHoi, CInD SEXUAL ABusE 188-99 (1984) for a discussion
of the extent of psychological trauma suffered by children. "That some children have
long-term reactions to childhood sexual victimization has never really been in dispute.
Clinical experience is rich in this regar" Id. at 196. See ROBERT L GEISER, HIDDEN Vic-
TIMS 26-31 (Beacon Press 1979); Arthur S. Frumkin, The First Amendment and
Mandatory Courtroom Closure in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court: The Press'
Right, the Child Rape Victim's Plight, 11 HkTIGs CONS. LQ. 637, 642 (1984) (dosing
trials can lessen the trauma suffered while leaving them open can create additional
trauma). For a discussion of studies regarding the extent to which children subject to
testifying are psychologically damaged, see David Libai, The Protection of the Child Vic-
tim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 979-86 &
nn.7-35 (1969). Libai states that the study of a child's trauma is difficult due to the
number of factors that may cause the child to suffer trauma and the different reactions
of independent children. Testifying in an open courtroom, cross examination and facing
the defendant can be factors leading to increased trauma. Id. at 984. See also Lucy
Berlesser, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U. MwI L.
REv. 167 (1986); Gail S. Goodman & Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's
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tions, poor interviewing techniques and mismanagement of
cases," 217 by all those involved including prosecutors, social
workers and police officers, often causes a slower recovery and!
or further trauma;218 in fact, the trial is often referred to as a
second rape.21 9 Frequently, the child is left feeling embarrassed,
ashamed and/or guilty.22°
Televising a trial would produce further damage to child
witnesses,221 as the child potentially finds herself testifying to
the world. The child's friends could see the trial and talk to the
child about the trial, possibly increasing the trauma.222 In addi-
tion, anyone could record the trial, which would be available to
view when the victim grew older. The result may be fewer chil-
dren coming forward to report crimes against them for fear that
they will have to tell their story to the world,2 3 or be subject to
taunts in the playground. 224 Even many of those who advocate
televising trials recommend an exception for children.225 An
abused child should be left with dignity both in childhood and
later in life.
In addition, a child's right to privacy is implicated when ad-
dressing publication and broadcasting of a trial.226 Although a
Memory and the Law, 40 U. MiAu L REv. 181 (1985); Michael H. Graham, Indicia of
Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Pros.
ecutions, 40 U. MIAi L REv. 19 (1985).
217. Grant, supra note 212, at 214; see also Josephine A. Bulkley, Evidentiary and
Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 89 Dic L REV. 645, 645-46 (1985).
218. Grant, supra note 212, at 214; Libai, supra note 215, at 982.
219. See, eg., Frumkin, supra note 216, at 637 & n.3.
220. See Burgess, supra note 213, at xv; Berger, supra note 40, at 88.
221. See BARBER, supra note 143; Tippins, supra note 109, at 7 ("public exposure it-
self may etch additional scars on the psyche of the victim).
222. "Suddenly, this child's life makes the front page of the papers and is on the six
o'clock news. That could be very harmful to the child." Alan Finder, Chief Judge in New
York Opens Family Courts for Routine Cases, N.Y. Tms, June 16, 1997, at B7 (quoting
Jane M. Spinak, head of the juvenile rights division of the Legal Aid Society of New
York); Tippins, supra note 108, at 7 ("An abused child, not to mention his or her school-
mates, may well hear the intimate details of his or her life discussed on the evening
news or, perhaps, on the Jerry Springer show or one of the other TV tabloids.").
223. "[The prospect of exposure has impelled some victims to conclude that their
private hell is less threatening than the public exposure." Timothy M. Tippins, supra
note 108, at 7.
224. The author is not suggesting that rape is something of which to be ashamed.
However, many victims blame themselves or feel ashamed. Burgess, supra note 213;
Cohn, supra note 216, at 281. The author is simply suggesting that these feelings should
not be compounded by a televised trial.
225. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 US. 560, 576-77 (1981); BARBER, supra note 143,
at 27.
226. Julian Grant, Note, Victims, Offenders and Other Children: A Right to Pri-
BARRING THE MEDIA
full discussion of this right exceeds the scope of this Article, vic-
tims have a legitimate privacy interest in prohibiting the publi-
cation of their names and faces in newspapers and on televi-
sion.2 7 Some child victims may even fear publication more than
testifying in front of the defendant. Closure can facilitate dis-
placement of this fear. When a courtroom is closed, the court
can control the information the media accesses.2 8 Accordingly,
the court can delete the child's name from transcripts if they are
released to the media.2 9 In fact, this is the most efficient way to
deal with the issue, while at the same time allowing the media
to disseminate other information. However, unless statutes are
passed requiring deletion, or courts are more willing to delete
names from transcripts, children must rely on the media for
protection. Furthermore, closure is particularly useful in a situ-
ation where the media discloses a name or a picture before a
motion for closure can be made, or before a trial actually begins.
Under these circumstances, there is no way to protect a child's
remaining privacy interest, other than to close a trial. Privacy
issues also take on a unique slant when children are involved
because children must rely on third parties to act in their best
interests.
The treatment of child victims, including their privacy
rights, is particularly perplexing when compared with the pro-
tections afforded juvenile defendants.20 For example, juveniles'
vacy?, 19 AM. J. CRIL L. 485, 496 (1992).
227. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims'
Names From the Privacy Rights of Rape Victims in the Media and the Law, 61 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1113 (1993) (essay providing the arguments for and against publishing rape vic-
tims' names in the press); Suzanne M. Leone, Protecting Rape Victims' Identities: Bal-
ance Between the Right to Privacy and the First Amendment, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 883
(1993).
228. Once the media obtains the materials they are free to publish it with out pun-
ishment. See supra Part MI.L
229. See Cohn, supra note 216, at 284. This is one way to protect a child's privacy
without having to rely on the media to do so.
230. See FREEDMAN, supra note 135, at 32-35; Frunmkin, supra note 216, at 637 &
n.2; Cohn, supra note 216, at 279-81. One article provides several examples of the pro-
tections afforded the juvenile defendant. Libai, supra note 216, at 977. For example, they
are interviewed by special police officers, the trials are heard in separate and different
courtrooms from those of adults, their cases are heard by different judges and their pro-
ceedings are less formal Id. Their records are also sealed.
In New York, the Attorney General's Office has proposed a revision of the laws re-
garding juvenile offenders. In particular a revision of the confidentiality standards is
proposed. The proposals include turning over all records of offenders ages 16-18 to the
local district attorney and allowing fingerprinting and photographing of juveniles
charged with a felony. Gary Spencer, Vacco Urges Crackdown of Juvenile Offenders, N.Y.
L.J., May 29, 1996, at 1-2. Recently, the Governor of the State, George Pataki, took on
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identities are shielded from the press and public,231 and media
access to their adjudicatory proceedings is often denied.232 The
juvenile defendants' records are sealed so that the offender
avoids public scrutiny and has the opportunity to start down the
"lawful path.m The child victim-witness should receive compa-
rable protections.m
Laws regulating closure should consider child custody pro-
ceedings as well. Approximately half of the marriages in this
country end in divorce, 235 resulting in the possibility that many
children are left to be provided for by one parent. Although chil-
dren can be severely affected by the divorce,2 6 they can be fur-
ther traumatized by the ensuing legal proceedings.237
proposals, including tougher sentences, which were approved by the New York State
Senate. Today's News: Update, N.Y. LJ. Feb. 14, 1997, at 1.
231. See Sally M. Keenan, Comment, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 11
HoFsIm L REv. 1353, 1361 (1983). Although media entities often impose self-regulation
on the publishing of rape victims' names, they are not required to do so. Only three
states have statutes ensuring that victims' names will not be published. See Denno,
supra note 227; Cohn, supra note 216, at 279 & n.78.
232. In re Oliver, 333 US. 257, 266 n.12 (1948); Austin Daily Herald v. Mork, 507
N.W.2d 854 (Minn. App. 1993); In re Minor, 563 N.E.2d 1069, aft'd, 595 N.E.2d 1052 (Ill.
1992); In re TIR., 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990); In re Hughes County, 452 N.W.2d 128
(S.D. 1990); In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844 (Utah App. 1989); Associated Press v. Bradshaw,
410 N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1987); see also Cohn, supra note 216, at 279; Note, The Public
Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 1540 (1983). Most
states mandate closed juvenile defendant proceedings but give discretion to the judge to
open the proceeding to certain interested parties. Other states allow the judges to close
the proceedings upon their discretion. Id. at 1540-41 & n.3.
233. Cohn, supra note 216, at 279-80.
234. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982) (Burger, J.,
dissenting); Cohn, supra note 216, at 279-80. There have been several suggestions for
ways to decrease the trauma suffered by children victim-witnesses. One of the most in-
teresting, but least discussed suggestions, is a separate courtroom, essentially a "child-
courtroom," constructed to accommodate the child while preserving the rights of the ac-
cused. The courtroom could have fewer seats, be smaller and provide a more relaxing at-
mosphere. The child would be able to see only the judge, the prosecutor, the defense
counsel and the child examiner. The jury, the accused and the audience would be behind
a special mirror. It should be noted that placing the accused behind a mirror would be
problematic, as it would implicate the defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment. See supra Part II.C and accompanying footnotes. See also Libai, supra
note 215, at 1014-18; Keenan, supra note 230, at 1376-78.
235. See, eg., Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the Limits of the
Law: On Dividing the Child, 92 Mc. L REv. 1808, 1808 (1994).
236. "If there is one thing about which virtually everyone interested in divorce and
custody would agree, it is that this process involves, and perhaps creates, the most
deeply antagonistic relations suffered by humans in modem society" Teitelbaum, supra
note 235, at 1816.
237. It is unclear how many couples must use the resources of the courts to resolve
their differences. Id. at 1817. However, if they do need the court's intervention, it is
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The discretion to close courtrooms under these circum-
stances is even more persuasive because the Sixth Amendment
rights of a defendant are not implicated. Furthermore, because
divorce and custody involve private matters, courts and legisla-
tures should be more willing to consider privacy arguments
when deciding whether to close courtrooms.238
B. The State's Interest in Protecting Children
The state also has an interest in protecting a victim-wit-
ness, and therelore, often takes the role of child advocate. First,
states have an haterest in protecting the psychological well-being
of a child victim-witness by protecting the child from further
trauma, embarrassment and humiliation that might arise in the
course of an open. trial.29
Second, the state has an interest in enhancing "the likeli-
hood of credible testimony from such minors, free of confusion,
fright, or embeflishment." 4 If a child testifies in front of a live
audience, or television cameras, there is a risk that the child
will be fearful and therefore incapable of giving a complete and
accurate account of the abuse. There is- also the possibility that
the child will be unable to testify at all. 24 1 Alternatively, a child
might see a large audience and think that it will be necessary to
embellish the testimony to gain credibility.
Third, the state has an interest in "preserv[ing] evidence
and obtain[ing] just convictions."242 In many child abuse cases
the child is the only witness.2  If the child is unable to testify or
is unable to give an accurate account, the prosecutor will be un-
able to obtain a conviction.2"
Fourth, the state has an interest in encouraging future vic-
tims of sex crimes to come forward.245 A child who knows of hu-
likely they have reached a point where they are highly antagonistic towards each other.
Furthermore, in a case which involves celebrity parents there is a greater likelihood that
the media is interested in attending the proceeding.
238. See supra Part HlA.3.
239. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
240. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 423 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Mass. 1981),
rev'd, 457 US. 596 (1982).
241. Frumkin, supra note 216, at 643.
242. Globe, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
243. See Evans, supra note 213, at 493; Harvard Note, supra note 213.
244. Evans, supra note 213, at 493; see Brian L. Schwalb, Child Abuse Trials and
the Confrontation of Traumatized Witnesses: Defining 'Confrontation" To Protect Both
Children and Defendants, 26 HARv. CRL-C.I, L REv. 185, 195 (1991).
245. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607. The Supreme Court found that this was not a compel-
ling state interest because the state advanced no empirical evidence to support the con-
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miliation that another witness suffered while testifying in open
court might be less willing to come forward for f;ear of being
subject to the same treatment. 24 Finally, the state has an inter-
est in deterring the possibility that potential or repeat offenders
will seek out people labelled as victims as easy targets.2 7
C. Protections For Children Other Than Closure
Many proposals, other than closure, have been advanced to
protect child victim-witnesses from emotional harm. These in-
clude screens, videotaped testimony and closed circuit televi-
sion.2" However, because many of these alternatives conflict
with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, 2 9
courts' decisions on their use have been unpredictable. While
the United States Supreme Court has not permitted the use of
screens,210 it has permitted the use of closed circuit television.21
tention that victims would not come forward if they knew they would have to testify in
open court. Id. at 610. However, there is data showing that victims are discouraged from
coming forward due to the treatment of previous victims who have reported crimes of
abuse and rape. See, eg., Cohn, supra note 216, at 269 & n.4.
246. Cohn, supra note 216, at 269 & n.4.
247. See Grant, supra note 226, at 496.
248. Bulkley, supra note 216; Ellen Forman, 2b Keep the Balance True: The Case of
Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASNGS L.J. 437, 443 n.45 (1989); Keenan, supra note 231, at 1353.
249. The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him... . U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
A defendant has a right to confront those people who testify against him. By remov-
ing the child from the courtroom or placing an obstruction between the child and the
defendant, the defendant can no longer confront the child-witness. As stated above, this
right is not implicated when the courtroom is closed. Beyond this brief description, and
due to the complexity of the defendant's confrontation rights, any insightful discussion of
these alternatives is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Bulkley, supra note
217, at 658-64; George Andre Fields, Maryland v. Craig- Suffering Children to Testify Via
Closed Circuit Television, 35 How. LJ. 285, 288-95 (1992); Katherine A. Francis, 2b Hide
in Plain Sight: Child Abuse, Closed Circuit Television, and the Confrontation Clause, 60
U. CN. L REv. 827, 830-42 (1992); John Paul Serketich, Note, A Conflict of Interests:
The Constitutionality of Closed-Circuit Television in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 27 VAL.
U. L. REv. 217 (1992).
250. Coy v. Iowa, 487 US. 1012 (1988). Cf. United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210
(8th Cin 1991) (court allowed a screen to be placed between the defendant and a testify-
ing undercover police officer).
251. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990). Several states have statutes al-
lowing closed circuit television. The following list includes those statutes that allow ei-
ther one-way or two-way closed circuit television. AL CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1993);
ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 12.45.046 (Michie 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 13-
4253(A) (West 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-86g (West 1993); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3514 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54
(West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1993); HAw. REv. STAT., § 626, R. EvD. 616
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The case law regarding the use of videotape is split,252 although
there is a substantial number of states that permit videotaped
testimony of children to be used at trial.
3
The alternatives reflect attempts by legislatures and schol-
ars to protect victim-witnesses; yet, many of them do not pro-
vide the advantages of courtroom closure. First, these alterna-
(Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434(aXl) (1992); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 421.350(1), (3) (Michie 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. art. 15:283 (West 1993);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 774 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. cl. 278, § 16D (West 1993);
Mica Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2163a (12Xa) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4)
(West 1994); Mis. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.84A-32.4
(West 1994); N.Y. CmRB Pioc. LAw §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney 1993); OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2907.41(C), (E) (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(B) (West 1994);
OB. REv. STAT. § 40.460(24) (1992); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982, 5985 (West
1994); RL GEN. LAws § 11-37-13.2 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law Co-op.
1991); S.D. CoDnED LAWS ANN. §§ 263A-30 to 26-8A-31 (Michie 1993); TEx CODE CRIn
PIOc. ANN. art. 38.071 § 3 (West 1994); UTAH PR CmL PRoc. 15.5 (1992); VT. I. Evm.
807(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150
(West 1993). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that closed-circuit television violates
the defendant's state right to confrontation. Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Children's Hour,
ABA J., May 1994, at 89. See also Forman, supra note 247, at 445 n.52; Jean Montoya,
On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1260 nn.4-5
(1992).
252. Compare Commonwealth v. Bizzaro, 535 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. 1987) with
State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445 (R.L 1989).
253. ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1993); Amz REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 13-4253(B), (C)
(West 1993); AR. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West
Supp. 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1993); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 92.53 (West Supp. 1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 626, &t Evid. 616 (Michie 1993); IDAHO
CODE § 19-3024A (Michie 1993); IND. CODE §§ 35-37-4-8(c), (d), (f), (g) (West 1994); IOwA
CODE ANN. § 910A14 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434(aX2) (1992); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Michie 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (1993); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN., ch. 278, § 16D (West 1993); MICaL Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2163a (West
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1994); Mms. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp.
1991); Mo. STAT. §§ 491.675-491.690 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-402 to 46-
15-403 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926 (1992); NEV. REv. STAT. § 174.227 (Michie
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1991); NM. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1993);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.41(A), (B), (D), (E) (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 753(C) (West 1994); OR PEv. STAT. §40.460 (24) (1992); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§§ 5982, 5984 (West 1994); RL GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-37-13.1 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-1530(G) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-
116(d), (e), (f) (1993); TEx CODE CPim PRoc. ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon 1994); UTAH 11
Cram. PRoc. RULE 15.5 (Michie 1993); VA. CODE § 18.2-67 (Michie 1993); VT. PR EvID.
807(d) (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 967.04 (7)-(10) (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-408
(1993); 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1988). See Craig, 497 U.S. at 853; Forman, supra note 248, at
441 n.26; Montoya, supra note 251, at 1260 n.3; see also Kee MacFarlane, Diagnostic
Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MiAI L REV.
135 (1985-1986).
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tives may not help the child concerned about privacy, because
although the child testifies from a separate room, the testimony
is broadcast to the courtroom for the jurors.M Second, many of
the alternatives involve a conflict with the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation. 5 For example, when testi-
mony is videotaped in a separate room, or a child testifies via
closed circuit television, the defendant is precluded from "con-
fronting" the accuser. Third, although closed circuit television
has been approved by the Supreme Court and goes far to protect
victims,2 6 both it and videotaped testimony can distort what the
jury sees.2 7 For example, the jury may not see the child's facial
expressions and gestures,25 8 or the camera may focus on the
child's whole body or just the face, or the camera may move
around or remain still while the victim is testifying. Further-
more, the jury will see only the victim, not the prosecutor or de-
fense attorney, limiting their view of the process. 25 9 When the
courtroom is closed, these issues are avoided. Courtroom closure
protects children from further psychological trauma, without im-
plicating the defendant's right to confrontation, and allowing the
jury to view the entire process. Thus, it should remain a viable
option in today's world of television-maia.
CONCLUSION
It is practically indisputable that children suffer from testi-
fying during legal proceedings. Furthermore, in child abuse
cases, children are often the only witnesses without whose testi-
mony wrong-doers may escape punishment. Moreover, due to
the stigma society places on sexual issues, our system should
make every effort to facilitate children's testimony without addi-
tional emotional trauma, at the time of testifying and into the
future.
254. Cohn, supra note 216, at 276-77. Accordingly, when the testimony is trans-
ported to the courtroom or played in the courtroom, the media would see it and be able
to broadcast the victim's testimony. The victim who knows this may be just as trauma-
tized as one who testifies in the courtroom.
255. Id. Closed circuit television is the exception, due to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Maryland v. Craig, 497 US. 836 (1990).
256. Closed circuit television protects many victims from potential harm. The vic-
tim, testifying from another room, does not face the spectators in the courtroom or the
defendant. She testifies from a more comfortable atmosphere which may make her more
relaxed and her testimony more accurate. But see supra note 254.
257. Cohn, supra note 216, at 276-77; Schwalb, supra note 244, at 200.
258. Id.
259. Id. For example, Schwalb notes that when the victim turns to look at someone
else in the room the jury will have no idea at whom the victim is looking. Id.
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In light of these concerns, why should the child's trauma be
increased by spectators, or publicity, for the sake of the media's
presence? There is no legitimate supportable reason. Although
the United States Supreme Court has given the media the right
to attend trials, it is not an absolute right. Because the media's
overriding concern in attending legal proceedings appears to be
to report morbid details in order to receive high ratings, the me-
dia's interest does not outweigh the interest in protecting the
psychological well-being of children. In addition, the media does
not serve as an appropriate substitute for public attendance at
legal proceedings which would otherwise ensure that the pur-
poses of open proceedings are served. Furthermore, because the
media can obtain all pertinent and newsworthy information
through transcripts,260 nothing further, that is truly news-
worthy, is gained from attendance; therefore, the barring of me-
dia for the whole proceeding is an appropriate measure taken to
ensure the protection of children.
However, many courts are not willing, in the face of rising
media coverage, to completely bar the media from a courtroom.
Accordingly, most courts permit representatives of the media
and the defendant's family to remain2 61 or permit closure only
during the victim's testimony.262 These tactics allow courts to
split the baby-provide a more comfortable environment for the
child, yet ensure there can be no allegation of a "secret" trial.2
63
260. When the media has not learned of and has not printed the child's name, tran-
scripts may be released with the child's name deleted. This allows the media to print in-
formation they gain that society wishes to know. However, where the media has already
ascertained and printed a child's name the transcripts should not be released. In that in-
stance, the media already knows who they are reporting about and for some victims the
damage is done. In child custody cases transcripts should not be released.
261. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 & n.29 (1948); United States v. Galloway, 963
F.2d 1388 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1989);
Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1539 (11th Cir. 1983); Fayerweather v. Moran,
749 F. Supp. 43 (D.I.I. 1990); United States ex rel. Morgan v. Lane, 705 F. Supp. 410,
411 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affid, 897 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1990); People v. Bensen, 621 N.E.2d 981
(Ill. App. 1993); People v. Holveck, 524 N.E.2d 1073 (IMI. App. 1988), affd, 565 N.E.2d
919 (11M. 1990); State v. Klein, 438 N.W2d 798 (N.D. 1989); State v. Suttles, Civ. No. 1987
WL 17248 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 1987).
262. It appears that after Globe, courts have not employed complete closure, i.e.,
closing the whole trial to all the public, as a solution to a child's psychological trauma.
263. Secret trials are described as a method of oppression and are one of the rea-
sons our system has a presumption of openness. See Estes v. Texas, 381 US. 532, 539
(1965); Oliver, 333 US. at 268-70; see also discussion supra Part IJ.
One author has suggested the following rule:
In criminal, juvenile, and civil proceedings, electronic media coverage of a wit-
ness under the age of eighteen in the courtroom or its immediate environs is
prohibited. The testimony of the witness shall not be photographed, recorded,
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The exclusion of the media, and the necessity for standards
when children are involved, is particularly pressing when the
discussion turns to the television media. Courts have been in-
creasingly willing to allow cameras in the courtroom and there
is a growing sentiment to accept the presence of cameras in the
courtroom. Although currently the television media does not
have a First Amendment right to televise trials, this status may
not continue. Most states permit cameras in courtrooms and
many do not have exceptions for proceedings involving children.
Furthermore, in the past, exceptions to the presumption of
openness for trials involving sex crimes existed. This fact has
been ignored. Accordingly, although there has never been a pre-
sumption allowing the television media in the courtroom during
criminal trials involving child victim-witnesses or child custody
proceedings,26 this could also be ignored. To avoid this outcome,
access of the television media to courtrooms should be limited.
To avoid further trauma to children, courts, at a minimum,
must be given and must use their power to exclude all the me-
dia during at least the child victim-witness's testimony. Courts
should also be willing to close child custody proceedings in their
entirety. Legislatures must pass laws precluding the televising
of children's testimony and of entire child custody proceedings.
In a situation where a child is suffering trauma, will suffer
trauma, or will be unable to testify coherently in an open court-
room, the balance of interests should shift away from allowing
the media to televise the trial, to protecting children. In the end,
the child's interests must prevail.
or broadcast. Attendance by the electronic media and print media shall be per-
mitted at the discretion of the presiding judge.
Pate, supra note 136, at 367.
264. For example, Floyd Abrams commented in discussing a recent decision in the
Southern District of New York permitting cameras in a civil trial that, 'cameras should
routinely be admitted in the courtroom.? Deborah Pines, TV Cameras Allowed in U.S.
Court, N.Y. LJ., May 1, 1996, at 1. Increased television coverage of places where cover-
age was usually denied will invariably force courts to consider the issues herein.
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